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Executive Summary 
This study examines why women remain underrepresented in Myanmar politics. Unlike most 
studies, we go beyond the structural and cultural reasons by revealing the dynamics of intra-
party politics –- the role of the selectorate and processes of candidate selection that affect both 
the demand and supply of women candidates at the party and local levels. The findings for this 
study is based on qualitative analysis of in-depth 72 interviews conducted from November 2018 
to March 2019 with members of nine political parties.    
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank all of the interviewees who gave up their time to share their 
experiences for this research project. We would also like to thank our EMREF colleagues for 
collecting and translating the data and assisting us with our analysis – thank you to Cing Van 
Kim, Hla Myat Mon, La Ring, Myo Thant Zaw, Shwe Ye Oo, and Su Su Hlaing. We would also 
like to thank Mindy Walker for the useful suggestions she gave. Finally, we are very grateful to 
International Development Research Council (IDRC) of Canada for funding this research 
project. 
 
Tables 
Table 1: Parties, Women Candidates and MPs Included in this Report ..................................................... 16 
Table 2: CEC Membership by Gender ......................................................................................................... 20 
 
  
3 
 
Contents 
Executive Summary 2 
Acknowledgements 2 
Tables 2 
Contents 3 
1. Introduction 5 
Research Aim and Organization 5 
Gender Equality and Importance of Party Politics 6 
Myanmar’s Parliaments, Geography and Electoral Systems 7 
Gender Breakdown in Myanmar Parliaments 8 
Existing Research on Gender and Political Participation in Myanmar 9 
2. 11 
Overview of Political Parties and Methodology 11 
Profile of Nine Parties Included in the Study 12 
Kachin State Democracy Party (KSDP) 12 
Lisu National Development Party (LNDP) 13 
Mon National Party (MNP) 13 
National League for Democracy (NLD) 13 
Pa-O National Organization (PNO) 14 
Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) 14 
Ta’ang National Party (TNP) 14 
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) 15 
3. Politicians’ Backgrounds, Experience and Motivations 16 
Interviewees’ Party Positions, Age Education and Occupational Background 17 
Family’s connection with politics 17 
Role Models 18 
Previous experiences in politics or public life 18 
4. Party Gatekeeper Selection Processes 19 
Who Becomes a Central Executive Committee (CEC) Member and How are They 
Chosen? 20 
4 
 
Who Becomes a Central Committee (CC) Member and How Are They Chosen? 23 
Who Becomes a Township Executive Committee (TEC) Member and How are They 
Chosen? 24 
5. Candidate Selection Processes 27 
Overview of Parties’ Candidate Selection Processes 27 
Organization of Candidate Nomination at Local Levels 28 
The Role of Central Committee (CEC) and Central Executive Committees (CCs) 29 
Preferred Candidate Traits 30 
Promotion of Women’s Political Participation 31 
Implications of Candidate Selection Processes 32 
6. Experiences on the Campaign Trail and as an MP 33 
Politics – a Cost or Benefit? 34 
Family life 35 
Difficulties travelling 36 
Financial Difficulties 37 
Violations of Personal Integrity 37 
Implications of Experiences Campaigning and as an MP 39 
7. Being an Elected Representative 39 
8. Key Findings 41 
9. Recommendations 43 
Bibliography 45 
  
5 
 
1. Introduction  
In November 2015, Myanmar held nationwide elections for its national and subnational 
parliaments. Vote-rigging and corruption were generally seen to be lower than in the 2010 
elections, and violence was not widespread. Further, many of the political parties that boycotted 
or prevented from running in the 2010 elections, competed in 2015. The National League for 
Democracy (NLD), which boycotted the 2010 elections, was hugely successful, and won the 
majority of elected seats in both the national parliaments and 12 out of 14 subnational 
parliaments.1 Although the 2015 elections were largely credible and open, and generated huge 
optimism inside and outside the country, they were not open to everyone. Around 500,000 
voters (largely ethnic minority) in Bago Region, Kachin State, Kayin State, Mon State and Shan 
State did not have the opportunity to vote because of security concerns, or because the 
electoral authorities could not access the areas to check voter lists. Further, around 500,000 
Muslims – primarily from northern Rakhine State – were denied their previous right to vote.2 
Although the elections were less violent than expected, there were scattered violent incidents in 
various parts of the country, as well as violent threats against politicians by certain armed 
actors, especially in parts of Kachin and northern Shan States.3  
 
The NLD’s victory meant that Aung San Suu Kyi became the (de facto) head of government – 
the first time a woman has led the government in Myanmar’s history. The number of women 
member of parliament (MPs) has more than doubled. However, women remain only around one 
in ten of Myanmar’s MPs, and Aung San Suu Kyi is the only female cabinet member at the 
national level.  
 
Research Aim and Organization 
This report investigates why Myanmar politics remains male dominated. Organized into 8 
sections, the introduction explains why gender inequality in politics matters and summarizes the 
statistical gender breakdown in Myanmar’s parliaments. Aside from an overview of Myanmar’s 
parliamentary and electoral systems, the introductory section also highlights key findings from 
existing research on gender and political participation in Myanmar. Section 2 follows with an 
outline of the research methodology used for this study and the background information on the 
nine political parties included for study. To demonstrate the importance of intra-party politics, 
Section 3 examines politicians’ backgrounds and motivations, while Section 4 and 5 compares 
the candidate selection methods between the different political parties. Section 6 studies the 
experiences of men and women candidates on the campaign trail while Section 7 highlights the 
unique experiences of women and men MPs in parliament. Conclusions and recommendations 
are provided in Section 8. 
 
 
1 International Crisis Group, The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implications (Yangon/Brussels, 2015), 
pp.15-16. 
2 Transnational Institute, The 2015 General Elections in Myanmar: What Now for Ethnic Politics? 
(Transnational Institute, December 2015), p.5. 
3 See Section 6 below. See also, The Carter Center, Observing Myanmar’s 2015 General Elections (The 
Carter Centre, 2016), pp.50-51; Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar: Women and 
Men Candidates in the 2015 Elections (Yangon: Gender Equality Network, August 2017), p.44; 
Transnational Institute, The 2015 General Elections in Myanmar, pp.3-4. 
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Gender Equality and Importance of Party Politics  
In 1995, the UN World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, China. This meeting of global 
leaders spurred an unprecedented push for gender equality in a number of areas. Specifically, 
the conference highlighted women’s persistent political underrepresentation as a democratic 
problem as well as a hurdle for economic and human development. The Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action noted that women were underrepresented despite making up half of the 
electorate, and despite movement toward democratization in many countries. It outlined that, 
 
“Women in politics and decision-making positions in Governments and legislative bodies 
contribute to redefining political priorities, placing new items on the political agenda that 
reflect and address women’s gender specific concerns, values and experiences, and 
providing new perspectives on mainstream political issues.”4 
  
In 1995, women made up about 10% of the world’s parliamentarians. Today, after the adoption 
of electoral gender quotas in more than 130 countries, women now occupy 24%.5 While still 
only about a quarter of the seats, it means that women’s descriptive representation has more 
than doubled in 25 years. The rise in women’s representation worldwide was largely a 
consequence of advocacy from the UN system, women’s movements, democracy activists and 
donors. The push has been underpinned by a surge in research on how women come to power 
and their substantive impact. Almost unanimously, most research has found political parties to 
play a key role in ensuring political gender equality. Political parties are the gatekeepers to 
women’s political representation and the manner in which they select candidates for elections is 
key to understanding the (lack of) diversity in the ensuing parliament.6  
Yet, women’s under-representation has often been attributed to women themselves. When 
asked about the lack of women candidates, political parties often lament that no women are 
willing to step forward, or that there are too few qualified women. These explanations , 
sometimes labelled as ‘supply-side’ explanations – blame women’s representation on a 
perceived lack of supply of eligible or qualified women.7 Others have suggested that more 
should be placed on the ‘demand-side’ explanations. That is, to understand what kind of 
 
4 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, p.79. 
https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/Beijing_Declaration_and_Platform_for_Action.pdf 
[Accessed 20th February 2020]. 
5 www.ipu.org [Accessed 20th February 2020]. 
6 Joni Lovenduski, Feminizing Politics (Polity, 2005); Pippa Norris and Jon Lovenduski, Political 
Recruitment. Gender, Race, and Class in the British Parliament (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995); Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, ‘“If Only More Candidates Came Forward”: Supply-Side 
Explanations of Candidate Selection in Britain’, British Journal of Political Science, 23.03 (1993), 373–408 
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400006657>; Miki Caul, ‘Women’s Representation in Parliament: The 
Role of Political Parties’, Party Politics, 5.1 (1999), 79–98. 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068899005001005>; Drude Dahlerup, ‘Electoral Gender Quotas: Between 
Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Result’, Representation, 43.2 (2007), 73–92 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00344890701363227>; Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, The Secret 
Garden: Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective (London: Sage Publications, 1988); Elin 
Bjarnegård, Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in 
Parliamentary Representation, 2013 edition (Hampshire, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); 
Elin Bjarnegård and Meryl Kenny, ‘Revealing the “Secret Garden”: The Informal Dimensions of Political 
Recruitment’, Politics and Gender, 11.4 (2015), 748–53. 
7 Bjarnegård, Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment; Norris and Joni Lovenduski. 
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candidates parties are looking for, and the type of formal and informal criteria used when 
selecting candidates to compete in elections.8  
Increasingly, there is a realization that supply and demand factors interact – when parties want 
to recruit women, they also motivate and shape women’s ambition, leading to more women 
stepping forward.9 Programs that focus solely on raising the skills of potential women 
candidates, rather than reforming parties in a more gender equal way would miss the point.10 
This report, thus begins with the assumption that we need to first view political parties as male-
dominated institutions, and understand the ways which women enter party politics, be 
nominated as a candidate and compete in elections. 
 
Myanmar’s Parliaments, Geography and Electoral Systems 
Myanmar’s Union or National Parliament is collectively referred to as the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, 
comprised of the Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) and the Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house). The 
Pyithu Hluttaw is designed to have 330 elected MPs and 110 MPs that are appointed by the 
military.11 The Amyotha Hluttaw has 168 elected MPs and 56 MPs that are appointed by the 
military. Myanmar’s State/Region Hluttaws vary dramatically in size, but all also reserve 25% (or 
slightly more) of seats for military appointees. In addition to the ‘regular’ elected MPs, many 
State/Region Hluttaws have elected Ethnic Affairs Representatives, to represent specific ethnic 
groups residing in those States/Regions.12 
 
All of Myanmar’s elected MPs are elected via a first-past-the-post system. For the Pyithu 
Hluttaw, each of Myanmar’s 330 Townships is a single constituency.  
 
For the Amyotha Hluttaw each State/Region has 12 constituencies – most States/Regions have 
more than 12 Townships, resulting in some Townships being grouped together to form single 
constituencies, but in other States/Regions the opposite is true, and some Townships are split 
into two constituencies. For the State/Region Hluttaws each Township is split into two 
constituencies. 
 
Since 2008, ethnic identities have been institutionally represented in four different forms: ethnic 
states, self-administered areas, ethnic affairs ministers, and constituencies won by ethnic 
parties. Geographically, the country is separated into seven Regions, located in the central area 
and dominated by the Bamar ethnic majority population, and seven States within the 
 
8 Elin Bjarnegård, ‘Who’s the Perfect Politician? Clientelism as a Determining Feature of Thai Politics’, in 
Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the 
Philippines, by Dirk Tomsa and Andreas Ufen (Routledge, 2013); Elin Bjarnegård and Pär Zetterberg, 
‘Political Parties, Formal Selection Criteria, and Gendered Parliamentary Representation’, Party Politics, 
25.3 (2019), 325–35 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068817715552>; Elin Bjarnegård and Pär Zetterberg, 
‘Political Parties and Gender Quota Implementation: The Role of Bureaucratized Candidate Selection 
Procedures’, 2016 <https://doi.org/info:doi/10.5129/001041516818254400>. 
9 4/18/2020 11:51:00 PM 
10 Carmen Geha, ‘The Myth of Women’s Political Empowerment within Lebanon’s Sectarian Power-
Sharing System’, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, 40.4 (2019), 498–521 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477X.2019.1600965>. 
11 Note that in 2015 elections were only held in 323 constituencies, and were cancelled in the other seven 
due to security concerns. However, two of these constituencies were able to elect an MP in the 2017 by-
elections. 
12 For further information on how Ethnic Affairs Representatives are elected, see, Transnational Institute, 
The 2015 General Elections in Myanmar, p.7. 
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borderlands dominated by ethnic minority groups. The 2008 Constitution created six Self-
Administered Zones/Districts (SAZ/SAD) for the smaller ethnic groups considered minorities 
within a State or Region, which have a majority within specific townships13. There are now self-
administered zones or districts for the Wa, Kokang, Naga, Pa-O, Palaung and Danu14.     
Gender Breakdown in Myanmar Parliaments 
The 2015 elections resulted in women becoming 10.5% of MPs in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, up 
from 4.9% at the end of the previous parliament, and only 2.7% immediately after the last 
general election in 2010.15 Across all of the State/Region parliaments women became 9.7% of 
MPs, up from less than 3% in the previous parliament.16  
 
There is considerable variation between States/Regions – for example, in Mon State women are 
nearly 20% of MPs, but in Chin, Kayah and Rakhine States there are no women MPs at all.17 
The reservation of seats for military appointees notably decreases the proportion of women 
parliamentarians – women were 13.6% of the MPs elected to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw in 2015, 
but only 1.2% of military appointees. Similarly, women were 12.7% of all the MPs elected to the 
State/Region Hluttaws, but only 0.9% of military appointees.18 The combined impact of the 2017 
and 2018 by-elections has been a slight decrease in the proportion of women in the Pyidaungsu 
Hluttaw to 9.9%, with women falling from 10.6% to 9.7% of Pyithu Hluttaw MPs,  and 10.3% of 
Amyotha Hluttaw MPs.19 
 
The proportion of female MPs is now much higher than at any time in Myanmar’s past.20 
However, it is still extremely low by international standards – as of 7th February 2020 the IPU’s 
global database indicates that Myanmar ranks 166 out of 191 countries for the level of women’s 
representation in the national lower house.21 For Asia, the average proportion of women MPs in 
the national lower house is 20.1%, i.e. double the level in Myanmar.22 Within ASEAN, only 
Brunei (9.1%) ranks lower than Myanmar, and some countries are far ahead, e.g. Timor-Leste 
(38.5%), Philippines (27.8%) and Laos (27.5%).23  
 
13 Kim Jolliffe, Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar (San Francisco, 
United States: The Asia Foundation, July 2015), p. 120 (p. 32) 
<https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ConflictTerritorialAdministrationfullreportENG.pdf>. 
14 Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and Matthew Arnold, Administering the State in Myanmar, Subnational Governance 
in Myanmar Discussion Paper Series (Yangon, Myanmar: The Asia Foundation, 2014), p. 59 (p. 14). 
15 Renaud Egreteau, ‘Legislators in Myanmar’s First “Post-Junta” National Parliament (2010–2015): A 
Sociological Analysis’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 33.2 (2014), pp.99-101; Gender 
Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, p.11.  
16 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, p.12; Paul Minoletti, Women’s Participation 
in the Subnational Governance of Myanmar (MDRI-CESD and The Asia Foundation, June 2014), p.11. 
17 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, p.12. 
18 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, pp.11-12. 
19 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, p.11; Corazon H. Ignacio and others, 2018 
Myanmar By-Elections; Building the Foundation for Successful 2020 Elections (Yangon: ANFREL, 2019); 
‘Results of 2017 By-Elections’, The Global New Light of Myanmar (Nay Pyi Taw, 3 April 2017). 
20 Paul Minoletti, ‘Women’s Participation in Burma/Myanmar’s Political Systems, 1920s-2010s’, in Global 
Handbook on Women’s Political Rights, ed. by Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Netina Tan 
(Palgrave, 2019). 
21 https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=1&year=2020 [Accessed 7th February 2020]. The IPU’s 
database lists Myanmar in joint 160th place. However, this database is outdated for the proportion of 
Myanmar’s lower house women MPs. The correct figure for the 2015 election results is 9.7%. 
22 http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/world011019.htm [Accessed 7th February 2020]. 
23 https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=1&year=2020 [Accessed 7th February 2020]. 
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While this study focuses on Myanmar’s gender equality in politics, it is worthwhile to highlight 
other aspects of political representation. Although we do not have exact data on the ethnic 
composition of MPs or on the total Myanmar population, the proportion of MPs that are Bamar 
and non-Bamar appears to roughly correspond to the proportion of the population that is 
commonly thought to be from Bamar and non-Bamar groups (i.e. Bamar being around 60-65%). 
Further, the three ethnic minority groups that probably have a larger population than any others 
account for the largest shares of non-Bamar MPs, e.g. Shan (6.5% of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw 
MPs), Rakhine (5.7%), Kayin (4.7%). In terms of religious groups, the Christian minority are 
overrepresented among the MPs, whereas Muslims are not represented at all despite being 
over 4% of Myanmar’s population. The share of MPs that are Buddhist roughly corresponds to 
the share of the general population – i.e. close to 90%.24 
 
Clearly, numerical representation in parliamentary bodies does not entail substantive 
representation. For example, although ethnic Bamar are not overrepresented among MPs, 
many ethnic minority leaders feel that decision-making within the dominant and highly top-down 
NLD is controlled by a small Bamar elite that pays insufficient attention to ethnic minority 
interests.25 Further, the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) continues to wield significant 
influence over policy-making and implementation in Myanmar, and is widely seen to focus on 
Buddhist and Bamar interests.26 
 
Existing Research on Gender and Political Participation in Myanmar 
Previous research to explain women’s low parliamentary representation in Myanmar has found 
the following to be important:  
 Cultural norms and biases that lead most citizens to prefer male political leaders, for 
females to have less confidence and ambition to try and become parliamentarians, and 
for it to be harder for women to travel to remote areas and/or overnight.27 
 The difficulty of balancing family and household responsibilities that women are typically 
expected to perform with participating in public life.28 
 Men dominate key leadership positions within parties at both national and local levels.29 
 
Gender differences in education do not explain the low number of women MPs – although 
women are more likely than men to have little or no education (e.g. never attended school or 
illiterate), they are more likely than men to be highly educated (e.g. completed high school and 
hold an undergraduate degree or above), which is of greater relevance for participation in 
 
24 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, pp.14-15. 
25 Transnational Institute, The 2015 General Elections in Myanmar, p.12. 
26 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 2nd edn (London, 1999), p.441; Matthew 
J. Walton, Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar (Cambridge, 2017), pp.33-34. 
27 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, pp.23-24, 30-31, 32-33, 37, 41-42; Gender 
Equality Network, Taking the Lead: An Assessment of Women’s Leadership Training Needs and Training 
Initiatives in Myanmar (Yangon, September 2013), pp.9-10; Gender Equality Network, Raising the 
Curtain: Cultural Norms, Social Practices and Gender Equality in Myanmar (Yangon, 2015), pp.59-63; 
Minoletti, Women’s Participation in the Subnational Governance of Myanmar, pp.25-32; The Asia 
Foundation, Myanmar 2014: Civic Knowledge and Values in a Changing Society (Yangon, 2014), pp.78-
79. 
28 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, pp.32-33; Minoletti, Women’s Participation 
in the Subnational Governance of Myanmar, pp.25-27. 
29 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, p.36. 
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parliamentary politics.30 Although women have a lower labour force participation rate than men, 
the gender gap is lower (and in some cases reversed) in many of the occupational backgrounds 
that parliamentarians are most commonly drawn from.31  
 
Political campaigning is expensive. Many parliamentary candidates have to use their own funds 
to cover some or all of their costs. This may pose a bigger barrier for women’s political 
participation than men. Research by Gender Equality Network (GEN) has found that party rather 
than gender difference matter. That is, parties’ varied financial capacity to support their 
candidates affect their abilities to campaign effectively.32 Although men and women 
parliamentary candidates both frequently face various forms of harassment, it may be the case 
that this is more likely to be a problem for women than men – a clearer finding is that 
harassment of women public figures is often gendered.33 
 
Myanmar was ruled by the military from 1962 to 2010. Although there is an elected government 
now, the military-drafted 2008 Constitution still reserves at least 25% of parliamentary seats for 
military appointees, and ensures that several key government ministers are appointed by the 
military (i.e. Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs). Further, the Constitution can only be 
changed with the military’s approval.34 Since very few women are appointed by the military to 
parliament, the reservation of seats reduces women’s numerical representation. The 
Tatmadaw’s long and intimate involvement in Myanmar’s politics has had a broader impact on 
political participation by reinforcing traditional concepts of male authority and superiority as part 
of a militarization of public space.35 
 
Although the majority of Myanmar citizens have a preference for male leaders, in the 2015 
elections, vote choice was largely based on party allegiance rather than on candidate’s 
characteristics.36 This may change for the 2020 elections but most voters are still likely to vote 
along party lines. This means that how and who the parties recruit, and the extent to which this 
process disadvantages women relative to men is critical. Our study thus addresses this gap that 
is understudied in the existing literature.37 
 
  
 
30 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, p.25. 
31 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, pp.26-29. 
32 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, p.40  
33 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, p.44. 
34 It has recently been suggested by one analyst that the Tatmadaw’s constitutional veto is not as secure 
as has often been assumed. However, this veto is very much de facto in place, and probably applies de 
jure as well. See, Jesse Hartery, ‘The NLD Cannot Circumvent the Military’s Veto Over Constitutional 
Amendments’, 4 April 2019 <https://teacircleoxford.com/2019/04/04/military-seats-in-the-pyithu-hluttaw-
the-limits-of-strict-constitutional-construction/> [accessed 8 February 2020]. 
35 Jessica Harriden, The Authority of Influence: Women and Power in Burmese History (Copenhagen: 
NIAS Press, 2012), especially pp.175-79; Zin Mar Aung, ‘From Military Patriarchy to Gender Equity: 
Including Women in the Democratic Transition in Burma’, Social Research, 82.2 (2015), pp.543-45. 
36 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, p.42. 
37 For a very brief discussion of this issue, see, Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in 
Myanmar, pp.36-37. 
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2. Overview of Political Parties and Methodology 
Since 2010, a proliferation of parties have been formed to advance democracy or reclaim lost 
rights of their respective communities. Broadly, three types of parties have emerged: nationwide 
multi-ethnic parties such as NLD and USDP; ethnic-based parties such as ANP, SNLD and 
MNP; and smaller Bamar dominated parties.  
 
In our study, we chose to focus on nine parties of different sizes, organizational structures, ages 
and ideological platforms. This study is drawn based on the data collected in 72 interviews 
conducted November 2018 to March 2019 with members of nine political parties – Arakan 
National Party (ANP), Kachin State Democracy Party (KSDP), Lisu National Development Party 
(LNDP), Mon National Party (MNP), National League for Democracy (NLD), Pa-O National 
Organization (PNO), Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), Ta’Ang National Party 
(TNP), and Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). This included the six parties that 
won the most seats across all of Myanmar’s parliaments in the 2015 election (NLD, USDP, 
ANP, SNLD, TNP, PNO), as well as the most electorally successful ethnic Kachin, Lisu and Mon 
parties (KSDP, LNDP and MNP).38 In addition to their electoral success, these parties were 
chosen to capture the range of sizes, organizational models, regional and political interests 
within Myanmar politics (see below).  
 
The interviews covered interviewees’ personal and political backgrounds; intra-party rules, 
promotion, and recruitment of candidates for the 2015 elections; and experiences as a politician.   
Our interviewees were grouped into two categories: i) ‘candidates’ – people who ran as 
candidates in the 2015 elections, including both those who won and lost the election;39 ii) 
‘gatekeepers’ – those who hold positions of authority in the party but did not compete in the 
2015 election. Most of our gatekeepers hold positions at the central level (e.g. party chairman, 
general secretary, central executive committee member, central committee member) or 
Township level (e.g. Township chairman or Township secretary). However, a few gatekeepers 
hold positions at the State/Region or District level of their party. The intention was to interview 
six candidates and four gatekeepers from each of the largest and most electorally successful 
parties in our study (NLD, USDP, ANP and SNLD) and four candidates and two gatekeepers 
from the smaller parties (TNP, PNO, LNDP, KSDP, MNP). This target was met, and one 
additional gatekeeper from MNP and one additional candidate from TNP were also interviewed, 
as it was convenient for the field researchers to conduct these additional interviews. 
 
Ideally, we would have liked to have interviewed approximately equal numbers of women and 
men. However, the strongly male dominated nature of Myanmar politics means that the pool of 
available women interviewees is much smaller. This is particularly the case for party 
gatekeepers, and we decided it was important to interview individuals in senior positions within 
their party, even though they are overwhelmingly male. Thus, 25 of our gatekeeper interviewees 
were men while only two were women. Our candidate interviews were more evenly divided: 28 
of our candidate interviewees were men and 17 were women. We were able to achieve gender 
parity in our candidate interviewee selection for KSDP, MNP, NLD and SNLD, but not for the 
other parties in our study.  
 
 
38 UEC database on successful candidates in the 2015 election (Hereafter, “UEC database”). 
39 N.b. one candidate interviewee from SNLD had been chosen by his party to run in the 2015 election for 
Kyethi Township, but UEC cancelled elections due to security concerns. This interviewee than 
successfully ran in this Township in the 2017 by-elections. All other candidate interviewees ran in the 
2015 elections. 
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The interviews were all conducted in Myanmar language by researchers from EMREF, and then 
translated by these researchers into English. The data analysis was conducted by one 
researcher from EMREF and three international researchers based on the English language 
data. When conducting the data analysis, it became clear that a few issues had not been 
covered clearly enough in the original interviews, and there were a few that needed 
clarifications. In February 2020 EMREF researchers followed up with telephone calls to a senior 
official from the central party apparatus from each of the nine parties to clarify the issues. 
 
Profile of Nine Parties Included in the Study 
The parties in our study include those that are: i) relatively highly institutionalized and have clear 
rules that are followed most or all of the time (e.g. MNP, NLD); ii) those that have a low level of 
institutionalization and processes frequently being performed in an ad-hoc manner (e.g. KSDP, 
LNDP, TNP); iii) parties that are between i) and ii) (e.g. ANP, PNO, SNLD, USDP). The parties 
in our study also have significantly different histories, political organizations, outlooks and 
internal party cultures – for the purposes of this paper the following categorization can be 
suggested: i) parties that are “old” by Myanmar standards, having competed in the 1990 
elections, and were then suppressed by the military government in the 1990s and 2000s (e.g. 
MNP, NLD, SNLD); ii) newer ethnic-based parties founded since 2010 (e.g. KSDP, LNDP, 
TNP); iii) parties with strong connections with the military establishment (e.g. PNO, USDP).40    
    
Arakan National Party (ANP) 
The Arakan National Party (ANP) was the product of a merger between the Rakhine National 
Development Party (RNDP) and the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), and was 
registered with the Union Election Commission (UEC) on 6th March, 2014.41 At the time of 
their founding, ANP’s goals were announced as ‘federalism’, ‘democratisation’ and 
‘development’; but in practice the party has had a strong focus on Rakhine nationalism.42 
Previously, the Rakhine National Development Party (RNDP), led by Dr. Aye Maung, was 
registered on 6th May, 2010, and won a total of 32 seats in the 2010 elections.43 The ALD 
was founded in 1989 and ran in the 1990 election, winning 11 seats.44 The ALD re-registered 
with the UEC in 2012, before then combining with the RNDP to form the ANP in 2014. As of 
February 2020, the party claimed to have TECs in 17 Townships and more than 20,000 
members.45 
 
Kachin State Democracy Party (KSDP) 
In 2010, Dr. Manam Tu Ja, former Vice President of Kachin Independence Organization 
(KIO), attempted to register the Kachin State Progressive Party with the UEC in time for the 
2010 elections, but was controversially prevented from doing so, along with other ethnic 
 
40 The ANP does not fit easily in the above schema, as it was a merger between the ALD – which would 
go in category i) – and the ANP – which would go in category ii). 
41 Information on party registration taken from www.uec.gov.mm [Accessed 17th February 2020]. 
42 Martin Smith, Arakan (Rakhine State): A Land in Conflict on Myanmar’s Western Frontier (Amsterdam: 
Transnational Institute, December 2019), pp.88-90. 
43 Enlightened Myanmar Research, “Factbook of Political Parties in Myanmar, 2010-2012” (Yangon: 
Enlightened Myanmar Research, March 2014), p.207 
44 Enlightened Myanmar Research, “Factbook of Political Parties in Myanmar, 2010-2012” (Yangon: 
Enlightened Myanmar Research, March 2014), p.95. 
45 Telephone conversation with senior central party official, February 2020. 
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Kachin parties trying to register.46 In 2013 Dr. Manam Tu Ja founded the Kachin State 
Democracy Party (KSDP), and, at the second attempt, this party’s registration was accepted 
by the UEC on 13th January, 2014.47 The KSDP claimed to have around 13,000 members in 
2015.48 The KSDP has now merged with three other ethnic Kachin parties to form the Kachin 
State People’s Party.49 
 
Lisu National Development Party (LNDP) 
The LNDP was registered with the UEC on 17th December 2013, with the stated intention of 
representing the Lisu people in Myanmar and to lead the development of that ethnicity.50 The 
LNDP has a close cooperative relationship with the USDP.51 As of February 2020, the party 
claimed to have TECs in 18 Townships and around 11,000 members.52 
 
Mon National Party (MNP) 
The Mon Democratic Front was established in 1988, and ran in the 1990 elections, winning 5 
seats.53 The party re-registered with the UEC after the 2010 elections, using the name the 
Mon Democratic Party. In 2014 the party joined with a few MPs from the All Mon Region 
Democracy Party and changed its name to the Mon National Party.54 In 2018 the MNP 
merged with other ethnic Mon parties to form the Mon Party.55 
 
National League for Democracy (NLD) 
The NLD was established in late 1988, in the wake of the popular uprising against the 
military government. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi became the focal point of the protest movement 
and was one of the founders of the NLD.56 She continues to lead the party today. NLD won a 
landslide victory in the 1990 election, winning 80.8% of the available seats, but the military 
government did not recognize the result of the election.57 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi spent most 
of the 1990s and 2000s under house arrest, and many other NLD leaders and ordinary 
 
46 Martin Smith, ‘Reflections on the Kachin Ceasefire’, in War and Peace in the Borderlands of Myanmar, 
by Mandy Sadan (ed.) (Copenhagen, 2016), pp.87-88. 
47 BNI Election Newsroom, “KSDP leader Dr.Tu Jar calls for peace in Kachin State during the election 
campaign”, October 14, 2015: https://www.bnionline.net/en/2015-election/kachin-state/item/935-ksdp-
leader-dr-tu-ja-calls-for-peace-in-kachin-state-during-election.html 
48 Telephone conversation with senior central party official, February 2020. 
49 Kachin News Group, ‘Another Kachin Political Party Merges with KSPP’, BNI (Chiang Mai/Yangon, 23 
December 2019) <https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/another-kachin-political-party-merges-kspp> 
[accessed 20 February 2020]. 
50 www.uec.gov.mm [Accessed 17th February 2020]. 
51 Emily Fishbein, ‘“The Blood Spoke”: Lisu Deaths Stir Unrest in Kachin’, Frontier Myanmar (Yangon, 11 
July 2019). 
52 Telephone conversation with senior central party official, February 2020. 
53 Derek Tonkin, ‘The 1990 Elections in Myanmar: Broken Promises or a Failure of Communication?’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 29.1 (2007), p.35. 
54 Susanne Kempel, Chan Myawe Aung Sun, and Aung Tun, Myanmar Political Parties at a Time of 
Transition: Political Party Dynamics at the National and Local Level (Yangon: Pyoe Pin, April 2015). 
55 Naw Betty Han, ‘Three Political Parties Merge Under Mon Party Banner’, Myanmar Times (Yangon, 26 
September 2018) <https://www.mmtimes.com/news/three-political-parties-merge-under-mon-party-
banner.html> [accessed 20 February 2020]. 
56 Bertil Lintner, Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s Struggle for Democracy (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 
2011), p.64. 
57 Lintner, Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s Struggle for Democracy, pp.6-10. 
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members were imprisoned during this period. NLD decided not to compete in the 2010 
general election, believing that it was not free and fair, including objecting to the requirement 
that parties must expel all members who were imprisoned or under detention orders.58 
Immediately after the 2010 elections Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest, and 
the party participated in the 2012 by-elections, winning 43 out of 44 of the seats it 
contested.59 As of February 2020, the party  
claimed to have TECs in around 300 Townships and at least 3 million members.60 
 
Pa-O National Organization (PNO) 
The PNO was established in 1949, and its armed wing – the Pa-O National Army (PNA) – 
fought against the central government for much of the next five decades. However, in 1991 
the PNO/PNA made a ceasefire agreement with the military government, under which the 
PNA became a ‘People’s Militia Force’, i.e. closely allied with the Tatmadaw.61 The 2008 
Constitution established a Pa-O Self-Administered Zone (SAZ), consisting of three 
Townships in Southern Shan State: Hopong, Hsiseng, and Pinlaung. The PNO competed in 
the 2010 and 2015 elections and in both elections won all of the seats that are elected from 
constituencies located in the Pa-O SAZ, meaning that it also occupied all of the elected seats 
on the SAZ leading body.62 As of February 2020, the party claimed to have TECs in 17 
Townships and more than 80,000 members.63 
 
Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) 
The SNLD registered with the UEC in 1998 and ran in the 1990 election, winning 23 seats.64 
The party re-registered with the UEC on 12th June 2012.65 At the time of the 2015 elections 
the SNLD primarily focused on trying to appeal to ethnic Shan people, but in March 2019 the 
party announced that they, “…are trying to change into a state-oriented or policy-oriented 
party.”66 As of February 2020, the party claimed to have TECs in more than 40 Townships 
and around 60,000 members.67 
 
Ta’ang National Party (TNP) 
The Ta’ang National Party was registered with the UEC on 24th May, 2010.68 The TNP seeks 
to represent the Ta’ang ethnic group, and to work together with other ethnicities to establish 
a federal system of government in Myanmar.69 In the 2010 election the party won 6 seats,70 
 
58 Burma Fund UN Office, “Burma’s 2010 Elections: A Comprehensive Report” (New York: Burma Fund 
UN Office, January 2011), p.8. 
59 Enlightened Myanmar Research, “Factbook of Political Parties in Myanmar, 2010-2012” (Yangon: 
Enlightened Myanmar Research, March 2014), p.133. 
60 Telephone conversation with senior central party official, February 2020. 
61 Kim Jolliffe, Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar (Yangon: The Asia 
Foundation, 2015), p.61. 
62 Kim Jolliffe, Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar, p.61. 
63 Telephone conversation with senior central party official, February 2020. 
64 Tonkin, ‘The 1990 Elections in Myanmar’, p.35. 
65 www.uec.gov.mm [Accessed 17th February 2020]. 
66 Myat Moe Thu, ‘SNLD to Change Focus from Ethnic- to Policy-Oriented Party’, The Myanmar Times 
(Yangon, 1 March 2019) <https://www.mmtimes.com/news/snld-change-focus-ethnic-policy-oriented-
party.html> [accessed 31 December 2019]. 
67 Telephone conversation with senior central party official, February 2020. 
68 Union Election Committee’s website: www.uec.gov.mm  
69 Union Election Committee’s website: www.uec.gov.mm 
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and this rose to 12 in 2015.71 As of February 2020, the party claimed to have TECs in 12 
Townships and more than 30,000 members.72 
 
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) 
The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) was founded in 1993, and 
although it  claimed to be a mass social organisation, it was led by Than Shwe – the 
chairman of the ruling military State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 
government – and other top positions were filled by SLORC government ministers. Further, 
membership of the USDA, “…was essentially compulsory for  civil servants  and those who 
sought to do business with or receive services from the state.”73 In 2010 the USDA was 
reorganized into a political party and on 8th June of that year was registered with the UEC as 
’Union Solidarity and Development Party’.74 In the 2010 general election USDP won 883 out 
of 1154 total available elected seats.75 USDP fared much worse in the 2015 elections, taking 
only 117 seats that time round.76 As of February 2020, the party claimed to have TECs in all 
of Myanmar’s Townships.77 
 
Table 1 shows the proportion of women and men candidates and MPs across all 
parliaments in the 2015 elections for each of the parties in our study. It is striking that 
women were less than 20% of candidates in all of these parties, and only one party has 
more than 20% women MPs – the KSDP, which only has four MPs in total. The average 
proportion of candidates that were women across all parties and independents in the 
2015 election was around 13%.78 Five of our parties were higher than average (MNP, 
LNDP, SNLD, NLD and KSDP), and four of our parties (TNP, USDP, ANP and PNO) 
were below average. Women’s participation as both candidates and MPs is strikingly 
low in ANP, PNO and USDP.  
  
 
70 Kudo Toshihiro, Results of the 2010 Elections in Myanmar: An Analysis (The Institute of Developing 
Economies, January 2011) <https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Region/Asia/20110104.html> 
[accessed 17 May 2019]. 
71 See Table 1, below. 
72 Telephone conversation with senior central party official, February 2020. 
73 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Myanmar (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), p.446. 
74 www.uec.gov.mm [Accessed 17th February 2020]. 
75 Toshihiro, Results of the 2010 Elections in Myanmar. 
76 See Table 1, below. 
77 Telephone conversation with senior central party official, February 2020. 
78 Enlightened Myanmar Research, Important Data of 2015 General Election Myanmar (Yangon: 
Enlightened Myanmar Research, October 2015), p.9; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 
Elections in Myanmar: 2015 General Elections - Frequently Asked Questions (Washington, D.C: 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems, November 2015), p.2. Note that there is a slight 
discrepancy between these two sources for how many of the 6072 candidates were women – Enlightened 
Myanmar Research states that it was 805 (i.e. 13.3%), whereas International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems gives the number as 800 (i.e. 13.2%), . 
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Table 1: Parties, Women Candidates and MPs Included in this Report 
 
Party 
Total 
Candidates 
(N) 
Women 
Candidates 
(N) 
Women as 
% of 
Candidates 
Total 
MPs 
(N) 
Women 
MPs 
(N) 
Women 
as % of 
MPs 
MNP 54 10 19% 3 0 0% 
SNLD 151 27 18% 42 7 17% 
LNDP 28 5 18% 5 1 20% 
KSDP 55 8 15% 4 1 25% 
NLD 1152 167 14% 886 134 15% 
TNP 27 3 11% 12 1 8% 
USDP 1151 69 6% 117 3 3% 
ANP 79 4 5% 45 2 4% 
PNO 24 1 4% 10 0 0% 
Sources: UEC database. 
 
3. Politicians’ Backgrounds, Experience and Motivations 
This section presents basic demographic information our interviewees, before briefly discussing 
their family backgrounds, their political role models, previous experience in politics and public 
life. This information helps us to understand what types of women and men become political 
leaders, and the formative experiences they have gone through. Research from around the 
world has demonstrated that these characteristics matter. In a study of developing countries, 
Bjarnegård and Zetterberg demonstrate that parties that select candidates who have held party 
office tend to have fewer women candidates than parties who do not use this as a criterion 79. In 
many countries family connections constitute one of the few ways in which women can gain 
political legitimacy and reach powerful positions.80 In another study on Singapore’s hegemonic 
party system, Tan shows that electoral incentives and party pragmatism can drive a party to 
nominate more women candidates to win elections.81 Other studies also shown that women, 
once in public office, serve as role models for adolescents and younger women.82 
 
79 Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, ‘Political Parties, Formal Selection Criteria, and Gendered Parliamentary 
Representation’. 
80 Farida Jalalzai, Shattered, Cracked, or Firmly Intact?: Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling 
Worldwide (Oxford University Press, 2013); Farida Jalalzai and Meg Rincker, ‘Blood Is Thicker than 
Water: Family Ties to Political Power Worldwide’, Historical Social Research / Historische 
Sozialforschung, 43.4 (2018), 54–72. 
81 Netina Tan, ‘Why Are Gender Reforms Adopted in Singapore? Party Pragmatism and Electoral 
Incentives’, Pacific Affairs, 89.2 (2016), 369–93. 
82 Christina Wolbrecht and David E. Campbell, ‘Leading by Example: Female Members of Parliament as 
Political Role Models’, American Journal of Political Science, 51.4 (2007), 921–39 
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00289.x>; David E. Campbell and Christina Wolbrecht, ‘See 
Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents’, The Journal of Politics, 68.2 (2006), 233–
47 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00402.x>. 
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Interviewees’ Party Positions, Age Education and Occupational Background 
23% of our female candidate interviewees but only 7% of male candidate interviewees were not 
married. The rest of the candidate interviewees and all of the gatekeeper interviewees were 
married. The youngest gatekeeper interviewee was 33 years and the eldest person was 76 
years, with a mean age of 58.5 years.83 37% of gatekeeper interviewees were aged 66 and 
above. Candidate interviewees tended to be younger than gatekeepers, ranging from 29 to 69 
years, and a mean age of 52.6 years. Only 13% of candidate interviewees were aged 66 and 
above. There was little gender difference in the age of our interviewees. In terms of age, our 
candidate interviewees fairly closely match Union parliamentarians as a whole – in the 
Pyidaungsu hluttaw the mean age of MPs is 53.5, with minimal gender difference.84 
Two of the male gatekeepers in our study had only attended primary-level education, but the 
rest of our interviewees had attended secondary-level education or above. Among our 
interviewees, women and men were approximately equally likely to have completed a university 
degree, but women (32%) were significantly more likely than men (9%) to have completed a 
post-graduate degree. The greater tendency of women than men to hold postgraduate degrees 
is a clear feature of Myanmar politics – in the Pyidaungsu hluttaw 22.7% of women but only 
8.5% of men MPs have post-graduate degrees, and across the State/Region hluttaws these 
figures are 10.7% and 3.2% respectively.85  
The findings for our interviewees’ occupational backgrounds were categorized with the 
occupational codes used to present the 2014 census data.86 The most common occupational 
backgrounds for our women candidates were i) education (24%) and ii) wholesale and retail 
trade and repair of motor vehicles (24%). Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor 
vehicles was also the most common background for men candidates (18%), but men were 
noticeably less likely to have a background in education (11%). Only 11% of men candidates, 
1% of women candidates, and zero men and women candidates and gatekeepers worked in 
agriculture, forestry and fishing compared to 55% of men and 47% of women workers for the 
Myanmar population in general.87  
Family’s connection with politics88 
60% of the gatekeepers interviewed for this study, including both of the female gatekeepers, 
had a family member(s) that had been involved in politics. Women candidates (47%) were more 
likely than men candidates (32%) to have a family member that had been involved in politics. 
 
83 N.b. all ages referred to in this paragraph are calculated as of 1st February 2016 – i.e. the first day the 
MPs elected in the 2015 elections sat in the new parliament. 
84 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar: Women and Men Candidates in the 2015 
Elections (Yangon: Gender Equality Network, August 2017), p.16. 
85 Shwe Shwe Sein Latt and others, Women’s Political Participation in Myanmar: Experiences of Women 
Parliamentarians (Yangon, Myanmar: The Asia Foundation, April 2017), p.37. 
86 Government of Myanmar - Department of Population, The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing 
Census, The Union Report: Occupation and Industry (Nay Pyi Taw: Ministry of Immigration and 
Population - Department of Population, March 2016), especially p.11. 
87 Government of Myanmar - Department of Population, The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing 
Census, p.11. 
88 This analysis mainly builds on Q5 (for candidates): “Has anyone else in your family been involved in 
politics? If so, please give details.” The same question was asked as Q4 of gatekeepers. ‘Family member’ 
was defined as including any of the following: parents, siblings, grandparents, aunts, uncles. 
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This is in line with politics in many countries of the region, where political dynasties and familial 
succession are common as ways to legitimize new political leaders 89 
Role Models90 
Historic national leaders such as General Aung San, U Nu, Thakhin Than Tun and Dee Dote U 
Ba Cho were given as role models by some interviewees. Somewhat similarly, the party 
founders and/or leaders of armed ethnic movements were also mentioned as role models by 
some interviewees from parties representing that ethnic group, for example: U Aung Kham Hti 
(Pa-O/PNO); U Sai Leik (Shan/SNLD); U Naing Ngwe Thein, U Naing Thein Maw and U Naing 
Tun Thein (Mon/MNP); and U Aye Thar Aung (Rakhine/ANP).  
Five women candidates but only one man candidate mentioned their father as their role 
model.91 Previous research on Myanmar also indicates that father’s political participation has a 
particularly large influence on the likelihood of daughters to become politicians, the most famous 
example of which is Aung San Suu Kyi.92  
Aung San Suu Kyi herself was the individual most commonly mentioned as a role model by our 
interviewees: 2 women and 1 man interviewee from NLD; 1 woman and 1 man interviewee from 
TNP; and (somewhat surprisingly) 1 man MP from USDP.93 
“We, the ethnic people, like Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. If our parties would not win, we 
wanted her party win.” (TNP candidate, female)94 
“I heard a lot about General Aung San when I was young. Then I heard a lot about Aung 
San Suu Kyi. That’s why I wanted to join NLD but unfortunately there was no space for 
me. At that time, USDP invited me to join their party. So, I decided to join USDP.” (USDP 
candidate, male)95 
Previous experiences in politics or public life96 
As expected, the vast majority of our interviewees had some form of experience in politics or 
public life before taking a current position. One woman and one man candidate did not have 
such experience. The man candidate’s occupational background was as a lawyer97. Similarly, 
the woman candidate had a law degree, and said felt that this, together with being ‘a well-known 
 
89 Mark R. Thompson, ‘Asia’s Hybrid Dynasties’, Asian Affairs, 43.2 (2012), 204–20 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2012.682366>..  
90 This analysis mainly builds on Q2 (for candidates): “Did you have any role model or leader who inspired 
you to join politics?”. This question was not asked to gatekeepers. 
91 Interviews HM-MMP10, LR-FMP03, LR-FMP06, LR-FMP07, SS-FMP01, SS-FMP03 
92 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar: Women and Men Candidates in the 2015 
Elections, pp.34-35. 
93 Interviews HM-FMP14, HM-MMP02, LR-FMP02, LR-FMP03, LR-MMP01, LR-MMP04. 
94 Interview HM-FMP14. 
95 Interview LR-MMP04. 
96 This analysis mainly builds on Q3 (for candidates): “Did you have any experience participating in 
politics or public life before joining the party?” The same question was asked as Q2 of gatekeepers. 
‘Politics or public life’ was defined as including any of the following: joining student demonstrations; being 
members of ethnic armed groups; being a member of a political party founded since 1989 onwards and/or 
having been a member of the, Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP); being members of the ethnic 
culture and literature groups; or participating in community development groups. 
97 Interview SS-MMP03. 
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person in my village’ and speaking three languages (Shan, Ta’ang and Myanmar), led leaders 
from her party (TNP) to approach her and encourage her to become a candidate.98 
Many interviewees from parties that have origins tracing back to the late 1980s (e.g. MNP, NLD, 
SNLD, and parts of ANP) described their political experience as including one or more of the 
following: being party members or candidates in 1990 election;99 as activists in protest 
movements such as the U Thant funeral movement,100 the 1988 uprising,101 or Saffron 
revolution;102 or being a member of an ethnic armed-group.103 Their previous experience in 
political activities encouraged them to join political parties, for example:  
“In 2007, I actively participated in saffron revolution. Actually, my ambition was just for 
better education, it is not the politics.  But I realised that we need to set up a good 
system, I joined the politics which I believe that every citizens should have 
responsibilities.” (ANP candidate, female)104 
Aside from political experience, a number of interviewees mentioned having a background in 
social or religious groups, or as teachers, as a means through which they had gained 
experience in public life and trust and respect from their community.105 Interviewees from ethnic-
based parties (especially KSDP, LNDP, MNP, SNLD and TNP) were particularly likely to 
describe having experience in community groups such as: ethnic literature and cultural 
committees; ethnic youth committees; or church-based social groups.106 
4. Party Gatekeeper Selection Processes 
Party bodies at Township and central levels – especially the central executive committee (CEC) 
and Township executive committee (TEC) – play a key role in candidate selection, and as 
described later in this section, also influence party promotion. Therefore, understanding the 
process of who becomes members of these key party bodies can help us identify the hurdles for 
women to access higher political positions and to uncover the dynamics of complex intra-party 
politics. Previous research has shown that when senior party positions are primarily held by 
men, this tends to reproduce male dominance. First, it sends a symbolic and discouraging 
signal to women.107 Second, people in senior party positions are the ones who have the most 
say over who gets in and who gets promoted, but they also exert a great deal of influence over 
policy priorities and internal party culture.108 It has been demonstrated in a number of different 
studies from various contexts that men gatekeepers will not just select men successors, but that 
 
98 Interview HM-FMP14. See also interviewee HM-FGK03, saying that her experience as a lawyer gave 
her an advantage relative to other women for becoming a politician, particularly for giving her the 
confidence to speak to crowds of people. 
99 Interview SS-GKTECM01. 
100 Interview LR-MMP01. 
101 Interviews HM-FGK03, LR-FMP01, LR-GKCECM03, LR-MMP01, LR-MMP03, SS-GKCECM03, SS-
GKTECM03, SS-MMP06, SS-MMP07. 
102 Interview SS-FMP02. 
103 Interviews SS-FMP03, SS-MMP02. 
104 Interview SS-FMP02. 
105 For example, see Interviews HM-MMP05, HM-MMP10, LR-FMP05, LR-FMP06, LR-GKCECM02, LR-
MMP04, LR-MMP07, SS-FMP01, SS-GKCECM03. 
106 For example, see Interviews HM-MMP02, HM-MGK06, HM-MMP07, LR-FMP05, LR-FMP06, LR-
MMP06, LR-MMP11, SSGKCECM01, SS-GKTECM01. 
107 Christine Cheng and Margit Tavits, ‘Informal Influences in Selecting Female Political Candidates’, 
Political Research Quarterly, 64.2 (2011), 460–71. 
108 Bjarnegård, Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment. 
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they will also protect the existing internal party culture and the existing practices.109 Such a 
status quo is favorable to insiders who know the rules of the game, but tends to disfavor 
newcomers, such as women.110 When there are more women in senior positions, more women 
will be nominated and selected,111 and new party priorities may emerge.112 
 
Who Becomes a Central Executive Committee (CEC) Member and How are They 
Chosen?113 
 
Table 2: CEC Membership by Gender114 
Parties  
Total 
CEC 
Members 
(N) 
Females 
on CEC 
(N)  
Females 
on CEC 
(%)  
KSDP* 36 11 31% 
MNP* 27 6 22% 
NLD* 21 4 19% 
SNLD 25 4 17% 
LNDP 31 5 16% 
PNO 48 5 10% 
TNP 19 1 5% 
ANP* 39 2 5% 
USDP* 45 1 2% 
 
As seen in Table 2, all of the parties in our study have male-dominated CECs, although there is 
significant variation between parties in the extent of this. Of the six parties for which we have 
complete data, KSDP has the highest proportion of female CEC members (31%), and ANP and 
TNP have the lowest (5%). Only two parties (KSDP and MNP) have over 20% women 
 
109 Tània Verge and Sílvia Claveria, ‘Gendered Political Resources: The Case of Party Office’, Party 
Politics, 24.5 (2018), 536–48 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068816663040>; Bjarnegård and Kenny, 
‘Revealing the “Secret Garden”’; Geha. 
110 Elin Bjarnegård and Meryl Kenny, ‘Comparing Candidate Selection: A Feminist Institutionalist 
Approach’, Government and Opposition, 51.3 (2016), 370–92 <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2016.4>. 
111 Cheng and Tavits. 
112 Tali Mendelberg, Christopher F. Karpowitz, and Nicholas Goedert, ‘Does Descriptive Representation 
Facilitate Women’s Distinctive Voice? How Gender Composition and Decision Rules Affect Deliberation’, 
American Journal of Political Science, 58.2 (2014), 291–306 <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12077>; 
Amanda Clayton and Pär Zetterberg, ‘Quota Shocks: Electoral Gender Quotas and Government 
Spending Priorities Worldwide’, The Journal of Politics, 80.3 (2018), 916–32 
<https://doi.org/10.1086/697251>; Ana Catalano Weeks, ‘Quotas and Party Priorities: Direct and Indirect 
Effects of Quota Laws’, Political Research Quarterly, 72.4 (2019), 849–62 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918809493>. 
113 This analysis mainly builds on: i) Q13 (for candidates) – “Please tell me how people in your party get 
chosen to be members of central committee (CC) or central executive committee (CEC)?”; ii) Q15 (for 
candidates) – “Have you held any position within your party? If so, how did you get chosen for that 
position?”. The same questions were asked as Q8 and Q10 of gatekeepers. 
114 SNLD, LNDP, PNO and TNP all provided us with a complete list of the names of the CEC members, 
from which we extracted the data in Table X. However, we were not able to get such a list from the 
parties marked with * and the numbers for them are derived from what a senior party figure told us via 
phone call in February 2020 and we were not able to independently verify. 
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members. In some parties women hold senior positions within the CEC, e.g. chairperson (NLD), 
vice-chairperson (ANP, LNDP); and in some others women hold CEC positions of some 
authority. e.g. treasurer (KSDP) and auditor (SNLD). However, in all parties the majority of 
senior positions are held by men. And, in PNO and USDP all senior positions are held by men, 
with women only being basic members of the CEC.115  
 
“The positions for president, Vice President, and secretary etc were assigned to men … 
The women don’t possess that kind of important roles. Women are just members in CEC 
and CC.” (PNO candidate, female)116 
 
Previous research indicates that across all of the 91 parties that competed in the 2015 election, 
only three parties (the Mon Women’s Party, the NLD and the Danu National Organisation Party) 
had a woman in any of the three most senior positions, i.e. leader, deputy-leader, or chairperson 
– these were the Danu National Organisation Party, the Mon Women’s Party, and the NLD.117 
Of these parties only the NLD won any seats in the 2015 election. As has been argued 
elsewhere, Aung San Suu Kyi’s position as leader of the NLD and Myanmar’s civilian 
government is a highly unique case and it is extremely unlikely that she would have reached this 
position if she were not the daughter of Myanmar independence hero Aung San.118 
 
As Table 2 shows, the size of the CECs for the nine parties under study vary considerably, from 
19 members for the TNP to 48 members for the PNO. How these parties chose their CEC 
members varies considerably, ranging from the highly democratic and systematic process of the 
MNP, to the wholly unelected and non-systematic process of the LNDP. LNDP is the only party 
in our study not to have at least some elected members on its CEC – interviewees gave slightly 
different accounts of exactly how CEC members were appointed, but it is clear that this did not 
follow a strict procedure: 
 
“We have not had a party conference since the party was established … and there was 
no systematic way of electing CEC members as well.”119 
 
In contrast to LNDP, all of the members of the MNP’s CEC were elected, following a systematic 
bottom-up procedure. The members of each Township Committee are elected from Village and 
Ward level parties. Each Township Committee sends around 20 delegates to the party 
conference. At the party conference, the delegates elect the CC and then the CC elect the CEC 
from among themselves.120 Several USDP interviewees claimed that their party followed a 
broadly similar bottom-up process to MNP,121 with one interviewee specifying that in 2012 this 
bottom-up approach replaced the former centrally-appointed process. 122 
 
ANP and SNLD both elect the majority of their CEC members, with Township CECs having a 
key role for nominating candidates and for sending delegates to vote on CC and/or CEC 
 
115 The data on CEC composition provided by MNP to the authors of this paper only specified who held 
the position of chairperson and secretary (both of whom are male), and the data provided by TNP did not 
specify the positions held by any of the CEC members. 
116 Interview HM-FMP15. 
117 Phan Tee Eain, Report on Observing Women’s Participation in Myanmar’s November 2015 General 
Election, 2016. 
118 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar, p.34. 
119 Interview LR-GKCECM05. 
120 See, especially, Interviews SS-FMP04, SS-GKCECM01, SS-GKTECM01, SS-MMP02, SS-MMP07. 
121 Interviews LR-GKCECF01, LR-GKCECM01, LR-MMP04, SS-GKDM01, SS-GKSM01. 
122 Interview SS-GKSM01. 
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candidates at party conference.123 However, SNLD also reserve 7 CEC positions for the 
founders of the party, and ANP reserve 5 positions for former members of ALD and 5 for former 
members of RNDP.124 ANP and SNLD both have some form of mechanism to ensure 
representation of different geographical areas – ANP has a guarantee of 1 CEC representative 
for each of its 7 Districts, and SNLD’s CEC automatically includes the chairpersons of their 
three biggest branch offices (i.e. Northern Shan, Eastern Shan, and Southern Shan).125  
 
NLD interviewees gave conflicting answers for the selection of the CEC. For example: i) two 
interviewees described the same kind of bottom-up election process used by MNP, culminating 
in CC members electing the CEC members;126 ii) another interviewee said that the previous 
CEC members selected the new CEC members;127 iii) another said that although the step-by-
step bottom-up was used from village/ward up to CC level, “…for CEC Daw Aung San Suu Kyi 
formed it with whom she likes.”128 A further interviewee gave a response that supports iii) but 
also suggests that i) is partially correct, i.e. “…CEC's chair Daw Aung San Suu Kyi selects CEC 
members by herself from CC members. Then she gets confirmation from the CC.”129  
 
PNO CEC members are nominated and then subject to confirmation at the party conference.130 
Interviewees were often not explicit as to who nominates candidates, or whether nominated 
candidates are ever rejected by conference attendees, but this appears to be a highly top-down 
process and one CEC interviewee stated that he was offered his position by party leaders.131 
Since 2012, the party has reserved CEC positions for representatives from five sectors, 
including, the Literature and Cultural Committee, the Blood Donation Group, the Traditional 
Medicine Department, and military representatives from the PNA.132 One CEC member 
interviewed described how a democratic CEC election process is not used, and he felt this was 
a good thing, as it would threaten party discipline: 
 
“If a voting system is practiced [for CEC or CC], a person could launch a lot of campaign. 
It could result in deviation from party policy. To become a strong and firm party, the party 
policy should be controlled by a trusted person.”133 
 
KSDP’s CEC and CC were chosen at the party conference. The party chairman described a 
fairly democratic process,134 but this was contradicted by several other interviewees from this 
party, who described a 15-member executive board having the primary role in choosing the 
CEC and CC members, with some members being directly appointed and others being subject 
to a confirmatory vote that was probably largely a rubber-stamping exercise.135 Several CEC 
members interviewees described being directly appointed to their position by the chairperson.136  
 
123 Interviews HM-FGK03, HM-MGK05, SS-GKTECM04, SS-GKTECM05, SS-FMP01, SS-MMP01, SS-
MMP06. 
124 Interviews HM-MMP07, SS-GKCECM03, SS-GK-CECM04. 
125 Interviews HM-MMP07, SS-GKCECM03, SS-GK-CECM04. 
126 Interviews LR-FMP03, SS-GKTECM02. 
127 Interview LR-GKCECM03. 
128 Interview LR-FMP01. 
129 Interview LR-GKCECM02. 
130 Interviews HM-MGK04, HM-MGK07. 
131 Interview HM-MGK04. 
132 Interview HM-MGK04. 
133 Interview HM-MGK04. 
134 Interview LR-GKCECM04. 
135 Interviews LR-FMP06, LR-GKCECM06, LR-MMP10. 
136 Interviews LR-GKCECM06, LR-MMP11. 
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Another interviewee went as far to claim that: 
 
“There was not a systematic process. He [the party chairperson] just appointed the ones 
who would listen to him.”137 
Interviewees from TNP gave quite unclear and sometimes contradictory answers for how their 
CEC members are chosen. 
 
Who Becomes a Central Committee (CC) Member and How Are They Chosen?138  
The size of CCs varies considerably, from only 58 for the TNP,139 to more than 200 for the PNO 
and 350 for USDP.140 For this study we were only able to collect complete CC membership lists 
for three parties, which shows that women are: 15% of SNLD CC members, 7% of NLD CC 
members, and 5% of TNP CC members.141 Previous research found that women were 9% of 
ANP’s CC members.142 
 
As described above, the MNP has a highly democratic bottom-up process for choosing CC (and 
CEC) members. ANP, NLD and USDP all have a fairly bottom-up process for selecting their CC 
members, with most or all CC members elected via a process in which Village/Ward parties 
nominate members for the TEC, and then the TEC nominates members for District level, District 
level nominates to State/Region level,143 and then State/Region level committees 
nominate/elect CC members.144 The interviews are not fully clear but it seems that in USDP 
State/Region committees directly elect CC members for their State/Region,145 whereas ANP 
and NLD State/Region committees nominate candidates for election to the CC, and there is 
then some kind of vote at the party conference to choose the CC members.146 
 
PNO’s TECs each nominate 2 or 3 CC members, however these account for only a small 
proportion of the more than 200 members of this body.147 The PNO reserves positions on its CC 
for a wide range of bodies, including (but not limited to) the Women’s Department, the Literature 
and Cultural Committee, the Blood Donation Group, the Traditional Medicine Department, and 
military representatives from the PNA.148 It is not clear from our interviews how the rest of the 
CC members are chosen. Interviewees from KSDP, LNDP and TNP gave inconsistent answers 
for how CC members of their party are chosen, likely indicating a lack of systematic process, 
with strong roles for party leaders.  
 
 
137 Interview LR-FMP07. 
138 This analysis mainly builds on Q13 (for candidates) – “Please tell me how people in your party get 
chosen to be members of central committee (CC) or central executive committee (CEC)?”. The same 
question was asked as Q8 of gatekeepers. 
139 Complete CC membership lists shown to field researchers by party officials. 
140 Telephone conversations with senior central party officials, February 2020. 
141 Source: complete CC membership lists shown to field researchers by party officials. 
142 Minoletti, Gender (In)Equality in the Governance of Myanmar, p.10. 
143 N.b. note that ANP goes straight from District to CC level, it does not have State/Region level 
committees. 
144 Interviews LR-FMP03, LR-GKCECF01, LR-GKCECM01, LR-GKCECM02, LR-MMP01, SS-FMP01, 
SS-GKCECM04, SS-GKDM01, SS-GKTECM02, SS-GKSM01, SS-GKTECM04, SS-MMP06. 
145 For example, see Interviews LR-GKCECF01, LR-MMP04, SS-GKSM01. 
146 Interviews LR-FMP03, LR-MMP01, SS-FMP01, SS-FMP02, SS-MMP03, SS-MMP06, SS-GKTECM04. 
147 Interviews HM-FMP15, HM-MMP12. 
148 Interviews HM-MGK04, HM-FMP15. 
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Who Becomes a Township Executive Committee (TEC) Member and How are They 
Chosen?149 
We do not have complete information on the size of parties’ TECs, and within some parties this 
seems to sometimes vary by Township – for example the SNLD’s TEC in Hopong has only 13 
members, in Taunggyi 21 members, and Hsenwi 35 members.150 NLD’s TEC size also seems to 
vary, but not so dramatically – three interviewees gave the number on their TEC as 15, ‘about 
19’, and 21.151 However, USDP interviewees consistently described their respective TECs as 
having 15 members, with a further 15 members on a ‘reserve’ list.152 The two interviewees from 
ANP that specified the number of TEC members both put it at 25.153 
 
This study was only able to collect limited information on the composition of TECs, and we only 
have exact data on TEC composition for two Townships of one party (SNLD). SNLD’s Taunggyi 
TEC has a high level of female representation, with nearly 40% of members being women, and 
women present in the positions of vice-chairperson and joint-secretary no.1. Whereas, women 
are less than 25% of the members of the SNLD’s Hopong TEC, and do not hold any senior 
positions within it.154 Given, the overall fairly high level of female representation in SNLD 
compared to most other parties, it seems reasonable to expect that many parties in this study 
will have more male-dominated TECs than is the case for SNLD in Hopong and Taunggyi. 
 
ANP, MNP, NLD and USDP interviewees all consistently described each village/ward party 
sending delegates to a Township meeting to elect the TEC.155 The election of TEC members 
seems to typically be done via: i) potential candidates nominating themselves; ii) delegates 
voting for their preferred candidates; and iii) those with the highest number of votes being 
chosen for the TEC. One ANP interviewee mentioned that larger villages are allocated more 
delegates than smaller villages.156 Somewhat similarly, an NLD interviewee said that larger 
villages/wards are allowed to nominate more candidates for the TEC.157 For ANP, in some 
Townships the most important positions on the TEC (e.g. chairperson, vice-chairperson, 
secretary) are voted for by the TEC members only,158 but in others all delegates’ votes count159 
– it is not clear from the interviews which process is more common. The three NLD and two 
USDP interviewees that mentioned how these important positions were chosen all said that this 
was voted on by TEC members only.160 
 
149 This analysis builds on: i) Q15 – “Have you held any position within your party? If so, how did you get 
chosen for that position?”; and ii) Q16 (for candidates) - “How do people in your party get chosen to 
become members of the party’s township committee?”. The same questions were asked as Q10 and Q11 
of gatekeepers. 
150 N.b. figures for Hopong and Taunggyi are from complete TEC membership lists shown to field 
researchers by Township party officials, whereas the data from Hsenwi comes from an interview with an 
SNLD MP from Hsenwi. 
151 Interviews LR-FMP03, SS-GKTECM02, SS-GKTECM03. 
152 Interviews LR-MMP04, LR-MMP08, SS-GKDM01, SS-GKSM01. 
153 Interviews SS-FMP01, SS-GKTECM04. 
154 Source: complete TEC membership lists shown to field researchers by Township party officials. 
155 Interviews LR-FMP02, LR-FMP03, LR-FMP04, LR-GKCECF01 LR-GKCECM01, LR-GKCECM02, LR-
GKCECM03, LR-MMP04, LR-MMP08, SS-FMP01, SS-FMP02, SS-GKCECM01, SS-GKCECM02 SS-
GKCECM03, SS-GKCECM04, SS-GKCECM05, SS-GKDM01, SS-GKTECM01, SS-GKTECM02, SS-
GKTECM03, SS-MMP02, SS-MMP04, SS-MMP06, SS-MMP07, SS-MMP08. 
156 Interview SS-GKTECM04. 
157 Interview LR-MMP01. 
158 Interviews SS-GKTECM05, SS-FMP01. 
159 Interviews SS-FMP02, SS-GKTECM04. 
160 Interviews LR-FMP03, SS-GKDM01, SS-GKSM01, SS-GKTECM02, SS-GKTECM03. 
25 
 
NLD and SNLD have a policy to ensure that their elected MPs are automatically appointed to 
their respective TECs.161 Although PNO does not have such a policy, in practice all of their MPs 
are members of a TEC. Other parties do not have a policy to automatically include MPs on 
TECs, although MPs are frequently in such positions. SNLD and TNP have policies to prevent 
elected MPs from being chairperson or secretary of TECs, but in the case of SNLD this is not 
always enforced.162 
 
KSDP, LNDP and TNP all have highly inconsistent procedures for choosing their TEC members 
and who should fill senior positions – in most cases central party members went to the 
Townships to organize the formation of the TEC, but how these meetings were organized 
seems to have been highly variable. These parties are fairly small, and in some areas struggled 
to find many people interested in belonging to their TEC, which limited the scope to have a 
formal selection procedure: 
 
“Our party is too small and is ethnic minority. So, it was not easy to find people who 
would like to be involved. We are still a long way from being able to compete with the 
other parties.” (TNP)163  
 
“Since the party just started, there were not many people to participate in our party. So, 
we chose some of the individuals that showed up in the meeting and no one [that was 
nominated] was rejected.” (LNDP)164 
 
“We did not really have proper procedures for township level party’s committee. Due to 
limited time we had, we just recruited randomly. We also got recommendations from 
religious leaders.” (LNDP)165 
 
SNLD’s TEC selection process is not fully institutionalized, with one interviewee remarking in 
this context that, ‘The ah-na-shin mindset is not gone yet [among local leaders].’166 
Nevertheless, it seems that in all Townships a meeting is held every one or two years to select 
the TEC, to which all party members can attend. The most common method of choosing the 
TEC members seems to be self-nomination, followed by attendees being asked to confirm or 
reject the nominees. Deciding who should fill the senior positions on TECs seems to frequently 
be done through informal negotiations among the TEC members.167 
 
In some locations the PNO’s process appears on the surface to have been somewhat 
democratic and bottom-up, with villages/wards sending delegates to the Township meeting and 
these delegates then either voting for preferred candidates or giving a confirmatory vote on 
 
161 Interviews LR-FMP01 LR-FMP02, LR-FMP03, LR-MMP03; Telephone conversations with senior 
central party officials, February 2020. N.b. for NLD Amyotha Hluttaw MPs representing multiple 
Townships are asked to choose the TEC of one of the Townships they represent, whereas SNLD do not 
expect their Amyotha Hluttaw MPs to be members of TECs. 
162 Interview HM-FMP11; Telephone conversations with senior central party officials, February 2020. 
163 Interview HM-MGK08. N.b. The interviewee later mentioned that conflict had made Ta’ang people 
wary of participating in politics. 
164 Interview LR-FMP05. 
165 Interview LR-MMP07. 
166 Interview HM-FGK03. This issue was also referred to in the telephone conversation with senior central 
party official, February 2020. N.b. Ah-na-shin can be translated as ‘dictatorial’, and in this context refers to 
local party leaders wishing to have unchecked power and autonomy. 
167 See all interviews with SNLD interviewees. 
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candidates.168 However, the comment of one TEC chairperson suggests that this process is not 
very active or meaningful: 
 
“The election procedures practiced by various townships were different … We Pa-O 
people are not interested in politics. No one complained about the election of TEC. The 
less we have to do, the better it is.”169 
 
Further, in some cases there seems to have been considerable involvement by central party 
figures – for example, the same TEC chairperson describes having been nominated for his 
position by the party president. A PNO CEC member described what he saw as the dangers of 
bottom-up TEC selection processes: 
 
“Some townships such as [X] Township practiced a voting system. The person who got 
the highest vote became Township party chairman and he had no political experience 
but got people’s support … The person who got the third highest vote was a 19-year old 
girl. She became a secretary but has not graduated yet.”170 
 
It is probably not a coincidence that the Township referred to above is outside of the Pa-O SAZ 
– in both the 2010 and 2015 elections the PNO won all available Amyotha, Pyithu and State 
hluttaw seats in their SAZ stronghold, but none anywhere else. Central party leaders probably 
care less about the composition of TECs in constituencies where they do not expect to win 
elections, and there are also likely to be fewer Pa-O people with political experience interested 
in participating in the local parties in such areas. 
 
While most parties adopt electoral mechanisms to form their CECs, this does not necessarily 
prevent senior/charismatic party leaders playing an important role in the appointment or 
confirmation process. Interviewees from the more personalistic NLD reported the strong role of 
Aung San Suu Kyi in the selection of CEC members. Similarly, KSDP interviewees described 
the strong influence of the party chairperson and deputy chairperson in the CEC selection 
process. It is likely that senior party figures are also able to strongly influence CEC elections in 
some of the other parties in our study as well, but this was not clearly reported by our 
interviewees.  
 
In some smaller parties senior party figures played an important role in selecting Township 
leaders and or TEC members in at least some of their Townships. Whereas, in the larger parties 
and MNP, Township leadership selection is more locally controlled, and for ANP, MNP, NLD 
and USDP this process is quite well systematic. 
 
The extent to which the selection of CEC, CC and TEC members is democratic and systematic 
varies not just between parties, but also within them – for example NLD can be characterized as 
having a democratic and systematic process for TEC and CC selection but this is not the case 
for their CEC selection. This highlights the need to pay careful attention to each party’s 
processes if trying to raise women’s participation – for example: 
 
i. If parties have systematic processes at township level, there is potential to work with the 
central level party to issue rules, guidelines or targets to township level, whereas such 
 
168 Interviews HM-MGK07, HM-MMP10. 
169 Interview HM-MGK07. 
170 Interview HM-MGK04. 
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an approach is not likely to be effective if there are not already systematic processes at 
Township level. 
 
ii. If CEC and/or TEC selection processes are strongly influenced by party leader(s) then 
that leader(s) need to be convinced of the importance of promoting gender equality in 
the rank and files of the party organization.171 
 
5. Candidate Selection Processes 
The ways in which political parties recruit and select candidates shape representative bodies. 
While it is often assumed that women lack ambition or capacity, not least by parties themselves, 
it has been demonstrated that the problem of underrepresentation of certain groups usually lies 
more with the parties themselves.172 Party demand for a certain type of candidate will create a 
supply of that type of candidate, by means of encouragement signal-sending. When parties are 
guided by patronage and clientelism, there tend to be fewer women.173 The way in which 
candidates are selected also matters. It is much easier for new candidates to enter a 
bureaucratized party which follows a set of formal and specific rules than it is to get in to a party 
where only insiders know what it takes to be a candidate. These parties are also much easier to 
reform, as a rule change is more likely to result in de facto changes.174   
 
The first half of this section outlines the processes used by Myanmar political parties for 
choosing candidates in the 2015 elections. The second half of this section discusses what type 
of candidates are preferred by parties, and what parties are doing to try and promote women’s 
political participation. This section finishes by discussing the implications these formal selection 
processes and aspects of institutional culture have on women’s and men’s opportunities to 
become parliamentary candidates. 
 
Overview of Parties’ Candidate Selection Processes  
In theory, the ‘standard process’ used by most parties for nominating candidates to 
State/Region and Pyithu Hluttaws was for the Township level party to arrange some form of 
candidate election process, after which the nominated candidates would be sent to CC and 
CEC level for scrutiny and then approval/rejection. Interviewees from LNDP, NLD and TNP 
described their party consistently following the ‘standard process’. Whereas, interviewees from 
MNP, PNO, SNLD mentioned that when Townships were unable to find enough candidates the 
central party would appoint them instead.175 KSDP was disorganized, which seems to have 
resulted in the ‘standard process’ not being followed– instead, direct appointment by the central 
party and candidates nominating themselves unopposed seem to have been widespread.176 
The ANP followed the ‘standard process’ for choosing candidates for the State/Region 
parliaments, but had a cooperative process between Township and Central level party for 
 
171 Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris, Gender and Party Politics (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1993); 
Sheri Kunovich and Pamela Paxton, ‘Pathways to Power: The Role of Political Parties in Women’s 
National Political Representation’, American Journal of Sociology, 111.2 (2005), 505–52 
<https://doi.org/10.1086/444445>. 
172 Geha; Cecilia Josefsson, ‘How Candidate Selection Structures and Genders Political Ambition: 
Illustrations from Uruguay’, 2020 <https://doi.org/info:doi/10.1332/251510819X15693187680761>. 
173 Bjarnegård and Kenny, ‘Comparing Candidate Selection’. 
174 Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, ‘Political Parties and Gender Quota Implementation’. 
175 Interviews HM-MGK01, HM-MGK04, SS-GKCECM01. 
176 Interviews LR-FMP07, LR-GKCECM04, LR-MMP11. 
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choosing Pyithu Hluttaw candidates.177 USDP interviewees gave highly inconsistent 
descriptions of the respective roles of Township and Central level party.178 
 
For choosing candidates for Amyotha Hluttaw, most parties had to choose candidates for some 
constituencies that covered more than one Township.179 PNO and SNLD dealt with this issue by 
having the central-level lead the candidate selection process, and in the NLD this was led by the 
State/Region-level party. ANP and USDP both had cooperative processes between central level 
and the relevant Townships. This issue did not affect MNP, as all of the Amyotha Hluttaw 
constituencies they ran in were in single Townships only. For KSDP, LNDP and TNP we were 
unable to get clear information on how Amyotha Hluttaw candidate selection differed from 
Pyithu and State/Region Hluttaw candidate selection.180 Except, where specified otherwise, the 
remainder of Section 5 is focused on Pyithu and State/Region Hluttaw candidate selection. 
 
Organization of Candidate Nomination at Local Levels181 
For most parties the key body for candidate selection at the Township level is the TEC. 
However, this is not the case for NLD and USDP. In the NLD a separate committee/selection 
team is established in each township, comprising, ‘…some TEC members, ordinary members 
and elder respectable people in the township.’182 The USDP also has dedicated candidate 
selection teams at Township level, as well as at District and State/Region levels.183 The 
Township Chairman is a key individual in the candidate selection process – around 85% of both 
candidate and gatekeeper interviewees described this individual as having an important role.  
 
An interviewee from TNP reported that that the internal electorate in his Township included 
various non-party members – e.g. village elders, Ward/Village Tract Administrators, NGO, 
literature and cultural committee, and ‘bachelors and maidens’ leaders.184 A PNO interviewee 
also said there was an important role for local non-party members, with abbots or monks 
sometimes nominating potential candidates.185 
 
When describing the role that Township-level parties had for candidate selection, interviewees 
from six parties (ANP, MNP, NLD, PNO, SNLD and TNP) mentioned their village/village 
tract/ward parties having a significant role for nominating candidates. Interviewees that gave 
details of this process described multiple villages/village tracts/wards in each Township 
nominating potential candidates, and then the final decision on candidate selection being made 
at Township level. 
 
177 Interview SS-GKTECM04. 
178 For example contrast interview LR-GKCECM01 with SS-GKDM01 and SS-GKSM01. 
179 Typically, such constituencies covered two or three Townships, but in some cases this was much 
higher, especially in Shan State, with Shan State 2 constituency covering 11 Townships. See, MIMU, 
‘Constituency Boundaries Amyotha Hluttaw, Elections 2015’ (MIMU, 2015) 
<https://themimu.info/sector/governance> [accessed 12 August 2019]. 
180 Telephone conversations with senior central party officials, February 2020. 
181 This analysis mainly builds on Qs 14b, 14c and 17 (for candidates): “Did your Township Chairman play 
an important role in selecting candidates?”; “Were there other individuals who played a key role in the 
candidate selection process?”; and, “Can you explain more of your party's rules, criteria and procedures 
in selecting candidates for the last general election?”. The same questions were asked as Qs 9b, 9c and 
12 of gatekeepers. 
182 Interview SS-GKTECM02. 
183 Interview LR-GKCECM01, 
184 Interview HM-MMP05. 
185 Interview HM-MMP10. 
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The Role of Central Committee (CEC) and Central Executive Committees (CCs)186  
The interview questions used for this study did not clearly distinguish between the roles of CEC 
and CC in candidate selection, which limits how specific our analysis can be of the respective 
roles of these committees at the central level. This issue is exacerbated by interviewees from 
the same party often having conflicting perspectives regarding the relative importance of the 
central-level committees to Township-level committees, and/or the relative importance of CEC 
to CC at central level. For example, compare the following responses from two NLD candidate 
interviewees:  
 
“In my opinion, the CC has no role to play in candidate selection. … [but the] CEC … 
plays a key role.”187 
 
“The CC has an important role. The remarks given by CC members and CEC are 
essential.”188 
 
Despite the limitations of our data, it can be confidently stated that for ANP, MNP, NLD, TNP 
and USDP the CEC had a more important role than the CC. For KSDP, LNDP, PNO and SNLD 
the interview data is unclear on this issue. 
 
Interviewees from three parties – ANP, MNP and NLD – mentioned that their party created 
dedicated candidate selection/election winning teams at the central level. These bodies were 
closely linked to, but separate from the CEC.189 Although USDP has dedicated candidate 
selection teams at Township, District and State/Region levels, the State/Region candidate 
selection team submits their recommendations directly to the CEC – i.e. there is no dedicated 
candidate selection team at central level.190 
It has been noted above that non-party members, including religious leaders, could sometimes 
influence candidate selection at Township level. Similarly, although candidate selection 
processes at central level are primarily organised by party members, interviewees from some 
parties in our study described external advice also being sought, for example: 
 
“There were some foreign advisors who made some suggestions and some experts from 
NGOs got involved too.” (KSDP candidate)191 
 
“There are people from outside who … were involved in candidate selection at central 
level. They worked together with CEC members in examining the candidates’ profiles 
and analyse them … This included law experts.” (NLD candidate)192 
 
186 This analysis mainly builds on Qs 14a and 17 (for candidates): “Did your central committee play an 
important role in selecting candidates?”; and “Can you explain more of your party's rules, criteria and 
procedures in selecting candidates for the last general election?”. The same questions were asked as Qs 
9a and 12 of gatekeepers. 
187 Interview LR-MMP01. 
188 Interview LR-MMP03. 
189 Interviews LR-MMP01, SS-GKCECM01, SS-GKTECM05. 
190 Interview LR-GKCECM01. 
191 Interview LR-MMP11. 
192 Interview LR-MMP01. 
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Preferred Candidate Traits193 
When interviewees were asked what characteristics their party prefers candidates to have, a 
wide variety of answers were given. The most common response was for candidates to be well-
educated (36% of interviewees), followed by young (22%), of a certain ethnic group (17%), and 
be popular/well-respected with the people (15%). Only 10% of interviewees mentioned 
candidates’ occupational background, only 10% mentioned their political 
background/experience, and only 8% mentioned gender. There were generally not major 
differences between male and female interviewees regarding the characteristics their party likes 
candidates to have. 
 
As indicated above, many parties put emphasis on choosing candidates with a high level of 
education – given that women are more likely than men to be highly educated (see Section 3), 
this should not pose a barrier to women’s political participation. Further, among the interviewees 
that wanted their party to introduce specific criteria that candidates should meet, several said 
that they would like their parties to introduce a rule to only have university graduates as 
candidates.194  
 
At the time of the 2015 election 7 of the 9 parties in our study were ethnic-based parties, and 
only recruited candidates from the ethnic group they seek to represent – e.g. ANP (Rakhine), 
KSDP (Kachin), LNDP (Lisu), MNP (Mon), PNO (Pa-O), SNLD (Shan), TNP (Ta’ang). The other 
two parties in our study (NLD and USDP) are ‘national’ parties that seek to represent all 
ethnicities, and have candidates from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. Nevertheless, the 
USDP gave preference to recruiting candidates from the predominant ethnic group residing in a 
given constituency,195 and the NLD had a general policy that was supposed to give preference 
to non-Bamar ethnic candidates.196 In 2019 SNLD announced that they will try to shift from 
being, “… focused on ethnic Shan people and Shan State … into a state-oriented or policy-
oriented party.”197 In the coming years it will be interesting to see to what extent this party is 
able to broaden its appeal to voters and potential candidates from non-Shan ethnic groups. 
In late 2013 the NLD introduced a policy to promote women, youth and ethnic minorities in their 
recruitment of parliamentary candidates, and one of our NLD interviewees mentioned that this 
was included in the party guidebook produced for the 2015 elections. However, only 5 out of 10 
NLD interviewees mentioned ‘women’ when they were asked what type of candidates their party 
prefers. Further, when NLD interviewees were directly asked about whether they had a policy to 
promote women candidates, 3 of the MPs interviewed said that their party had no such policy. 
This suggests that that this policy was not complied with in all Townships. This interpretation is 
supported by one female NLD MP (in response to a different question) saying that: 
 
“We do have the priority or preferences for women, ethnic people and youth but the rule 
should be straight and make sure its implement in practice.”198 
 
 
193 This analysis mainly builds on Qs 20 and 23 (for candidates): “In your opinion, what kind of candidates 
does your party prefer? Are there specific criteria or skills your party is looking for?”; and “In the 2015 
elections did your party have policies to increase the number of female candidates? If so, how effective 
do you think these were?”. The same questions were asked as Qs 15 and 18 of gatekeepers. 
194 Interviews HM-FMP08, HM-FMP11, LR-MMP11. 
195 Interview LR-FMP04. 
196 Interviews LR-FMP01, LR-FMP02, LR-GKCECM02, LR-MMP01, SS-GKTECM03. 
197 Myat Moe Thu, ‘SNLD to Change Focus from Ethnic- to Policy-Oriented Party’. 
198 Interview LR-FMP02. 
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As expected, party experience was a significant factor for candidate selection – 80% of the 
candidates interviewed for this study had previously held a specific position within the party (e.g. 
CEC, CC, District Committee, or TEC member). One GK interviewee from USDP acknowledged 
that their party gives preference to potential candidates with a background in the Tatmadaw.199 
 
Promotion of Women’s Political Participation200  
Only one of our interviewees thought that his party had an effective policy to increase the 
number of female candidates in the 2015 election.201 And, only two interviewees thought that 
their party had got the gender balance about right for their list of candidates. These were both 
men candidates – one from SNLD and one from TNP.202 Only 18% of SNLD and 11% of TNP 
candidates were women.203 The MP from SNLD incorrectly claimed that 30% of his party’s 
candidates were women. 
 
Members of the same party often gave highly inconsistent answers when asked if their party 
had a policy to increase the number of female candidates in the 2015 election. LNDP was the 
only party for which interviewees give consistent answers – all six interviewees saying that their 
party had no such policy. Among interviewees from NLD (which, in theory at least, had a fairly 
clear policy to promote women candidates), all 4 GKs and the 3 women MPs said that their 
party had a policy but it was not very/at all effective, whereas all 3 of the men MPs thought that 
their party had no such policy.  
 
Among SNLD interviewees the majority said that their party had no policy to increase the 
number of women candidates. Despite the lack of awareness among our SNLD interviewees 
about such a policy, it appears party leaders at central level and at least some Townships were 
making ad-hoc efforts to raise the number of women candidates. For example, one female 
SNLD candidate described her experience of being directly appointed to a winnable 
constituency, even though she had not sought such a role: 
 
“In my Township, I was a Township party officer but I didn’t know they nominated me. I 
did not even say I wanted to be elected. I was so surprised when I received the letter 
from CC. I did not get a chance to refuse at that time. I requested to the Township party 
that if I was selected as a candidate, please assign me for Shan State hluttaw because I 
have a baby and I can’t go to Naypyitaw. However, the Township party didn’t listen to 
me. They sent the [candidate] list to the CC. Finally, I was assigned as a Pyithu Hluttaw 
candidate.”204 
 
One woman interviewee from USDP mentioned at two points in her interview that the party had 
allocated women candidates to unwinnable seats, just to increase their number of female 
candidates.205 Support for this claim can be seen in women being 6.1% of USDP’s total 
 
199 LR-GKCECM01. 
200 This analysis mainly builds on Qs 23 and 24 (for candidates): “In the 2015 elections, did your party 
have policies to increase the number of female candidates? If so, how effective do you think these 
were?”; and “Does your party have any plans or policies to try and increase the number of female 
candidates for 2020?”. The same questions were asked as Qs 18 and 19 of gatekeepers. 
201 Interview LR-MMP10. 
202 Interviews HM-MMP03, HM-MMP04. 
203 UEC database. 
204 Interview HM-FMP09. 
205 Interview LR-GKCECM01. 
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candidates but only 2.6% of their successful candidates in the 2015 elections.206 This is in 
contrast with the aggregate trend for the 2015 election – women were 13.6% of successful 
candidates and 13.5% of total candidates for the Pyidaungsu hluttaw.207 
 
Nearly 60% of our interviewees said that their party had some kind of plan or policy to try and 
raise their number of women candidates for the 2020 election, around 25% said that their party 
had no such policy, and the remainder either did not know or did not answer this question. 
There was almost no gender difference for interviewees’ response whether their party had such 
a policy for 2020. Interviewees who mentioned such policies typically gave vague answers, or if 
being specific, mentioned workshops or trainings.208 While such activities can sometimes be 
beneficial, their level of impact is variable or limited, and in some cases non-existent. Further, 
these are often organized and/or financed by external organizations, so tend to involve limited 
effort or financial contributions by the party. Three interviewees from SNLD said that their party 
was targeting having 30% women candidates for the 2020 election,209 and the recently merged 
ethnic Chin party (the Chin National League for Democracy – CNLD) also publicly announced 
that it will follow such a policy.210 If these parties strictly enforce these policies they will be a 
much stronger attempt at raising women’s participation than workshops or trainings. 
 
Multiple interviewees from each of KSDP, NLD and USDP mentioned the positive role that they 
felt their women’s committee/wing could play for promoting the number of women candidates, 
and women’s participation in the party.211 These bodies may have such an effect, but there is 
also a risk that these become silos and actually limit gender equality within the parties.212 
 
Implications of Candidate Selection Processes  
There is not an exact relationship between how parties are organized and arranged their 
candidate selection. Nevertheless, four of the five parties in our study with the highest 
percentage of female candidates in the 2015 elections have a fairly bottom-up candidate 
selection process (e.g. LNDP, MNP, NLD and SNLD). Further, it is notable that this category 
includes the three parties in our study that participated in the 1990 elections, were then pushed 
underground for most of the following two decades, and can be categorized as highly pro-
democracy in their policy positions (i.e. MNP, NLD and SNLD). Whereas, the two parties in our 
study that are most closely linked to military organizations and have probably the least 
democratic outlook of the parties in our study – PNO (the PNA/People’s Militia Force) and 
USDP (the Tatmadaw) – have very few women candidates, and very low levels of women’s 
participation in their parties overall. 
 
 
206 Extracted from Enlightened Myanmar Research, Important Data of 2015 General Election Myanmar, 
p.27; UEC database. 
207 Paul Minoletti, Gender (in)Equality in the Governance of Myanmar: Past, Present, and Potential 
Strategies for Change (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, April 2016), p.6. 
208 Interviews HM-MGK01, HM-MGK04, SS-GKTECM04, SS-MMP06. 
209 Interviews HM-FMP08, HM-FMP11, HM-MGK01. 
210 Swe Lei Mon, ‘Women To Make Up 30% Of Chin Party Candidates’, Myanmar Times (Yangon, 22 
October 2019) <https://www.mmtimes.com/news/women-make-30-chin-party-candidates.html> [accessed 
20 February 2020]. 
211 Interviews LR-FMP03, LR-FMP06, LR-GKCECM02, LR-GKCECM06, LR-MMP02, LR-MMP03, SS-
GKDM01, SS-GKSM01, SS-GKTECM01 
212 N.b. this risk was highlighted by an individual who has given trainings to many Myanmar political 
parties, in conversation with one of the authors of this paper. 
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Cultural differences between ethnic groups may explain some of the difference in women’s 
representation within parties – for example, Pa’O and Rakhine culture tends to be highly 
patriarchal,213 and the ANP and PNO both have very low levels of female participation. 
However, such cultural effects do not fully determine women’s level of participation, and for 
exampleKachin society is traditionally highly patriarchal,214 but KSDP does not have particularly 
low levels of female participation.  
 
Overall, parties’ histories and political outlook are probably more important for the level of 
women’s representation than traditional gender relations within the ethnic group(s) they 
represent. Further, parties can work to change gender relations within the communities they 
represent – Chin society is also traditionally highly patriarchal,215 but the CNLD target of 30% 
women candidates for the 2020 election represents an attempt to challenge that. 
 
As with gatekeeper selection processes, there is considerable heterogeneity both between and 
within parties for how candidates are selected. Within-party heterogeneity is particularly 
common for how Amyotha hluttaw candidates are selected relative to other candidates, but also 
arises in some parties for various other reasons as well. Again, this points to the importance of 
paying attention to individual parties’ candidate selection methods if trying to work with parties to 
raise the number of women candidates.  
 
Parties adopting targets to achieve 30% of women candidates has the potential to significantly 
raise the percentage of parliamentarians that are women, and this should be further promoted – 
both in encouraging more parties to adopt such policies, and helping those that have to 
implement it well. 
 
6. Experiences on the Campaign Trail and as an MP 
It is a big step to decide to become politically active and it may also be difficult to foresee the 
consequences of this decision. This section will look at some of the personal consequences for 
the candidates and it will seek to discern whether the experiences are different depending on 
your gender or party affiliation. The decision to become a candidate can have both positive and 
negative consequences for the individual, but while the positive consequences are 
acknowledged, the section focuses on negative consequences that need to be tackled in order 
to strengthen democracy and reduce the cost of becoming a politician. While it is clear that 
political activity comes at a cost, this cost should be as low as possible, and it should be evenly 
distributed between different candidates to ensure a fair electoral race. Research in the area 
has highlighted that many of the costs of politics are, in fact, gendered.216 This section looks 
more closely at whether this is also true in the Myanmar context.  
 
213 Interview HM-FMP15; Annami Löfving, Women’s Participation in Public Life in Myanmar (Yangon: 
ActionAid, CARE and Oxfam, 2011), p.30. 
214 Minoletti, Women’s Participation in the Subnational Governance of Myanmar, pp.19, 20, 25. 
215 Myanmar Institute for Integrated Development, Support to Chin State’s Comprehensive 5-Year 
Development Plan and Annual Planning 2016-2021, Vol.1 (Yangon, October 2014), p.30. 
216 Gabrielle S. Bardall, ‘Violence, Politics, and Gender’, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2018 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.208>; Gabrielle Bardall, Elin Bjarnegård, and 
Jennifer M. Piscopo, ‘How Is Political Violence Gendered? Disentangling Motives, Forms, and Impacts’:, 
Political Studies, 2019 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719881812>; Mona Lena Krook, ‘Violence 
Against Women in Politics’, Journal of Democracy, 28.1 (2017), 74–88 
<https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0007>; Mona Lena Krook and Juliana Restrepo Sanín, ‘The Cost of 
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Politics – a Cost or Benefit?217 
In Myanmar, most candidates seem to think that the personal costs outweigh the benefits. Over 
80% of both women and men candidates agreed that there were no significant improvements in 
their personal lives as a consequence of their political activities. Among candidates of older and 
bigger parties (e.g. NLD, SNLD, USDP), about one third had noticed some improvement, while 
only three candidates from smaller ethnic parties noticed any benefits at all. 
In a country that has been under military rule and that has experienced oppression of political 
opposition and widespread armed conflict, politics has long been recognized as a potentially 
dangerous activity. Some of our interviewees had spent considerable time in prison, although 
not in relation to this particular election campaign.218 It does however colour their own as well as 
others’ perceptions about what it implies to be in politics. Some candidates even expected a 
very difficult situation, including threats and intimidation, and maybe even imprisonment. One 
woman candidate from the ANP said: 
 
“When I reached the political field, I had seen attacks to get positions and authority. I 
had already prepared my mind if I am arrested because of someone's attacks, I had 
already told my daughters not to meet me at the prison.”219 
 
The results indicating that only about one third of candidates encountered difficulties should be 
interpreted with a pinch of salt. Most candidates seem to view certain difficulties as “a way of 
politics” to the extent that they do not even think it is worth mentioning. Similar patterns have 
been discerned elsewhere in research on violent elections – violations that are perceived as 
“everyday experiences” are simply not noted by respondents, because they happen all the 
time.220  
 
It is also important to note that the benefits that are mentioned are associated not with being 
candidate, but with being an MP. None of the nine interviewed candidates who lost the election 
experienced any improvements at all.221 Several candidates say that although the campaign 
itself may have been troublesome, they have gained respect, honour and recognition in the 
community once they were elected to become Members of Parliament.222 One noticeable 
difference has been that the mothers and wives of elected Members of Parliament have been 
treated with more respect; such as now being called Sayama.223 An NLD candidate joked that 
old friends, co-workers and even people who did not like him before all of a sudden got back in 
touch when he was elected.224 An SNLD candidate expressed his pride in being an MP.225 
 
Doing Politics? Analyzing Violence and Harassment against Female Politicians’, Perspectives on Politics, 
undefined/ed, 1–16 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397>. 
217 This analysis mainly builds on Q10 (for candidates): “Has your participation in politics resulted in any 
difficulties or improvements in your home life?”. The same question was asked as Q6 of gatekeepers.  
218 Interviews HM-MGK01, HM-MGK06, LR-FMP03, LR-GKCECM02, SS-MMP07. 
219 Interview SS-FMP01. 
220 Bjarnegård, Elin. 2018. Gender and Election Violence. Advancing the Comparative Agenda. 
Comparative Politics Newsletter 27(1).  
221 Interviews HM-FMP14, HM-FMP15, HM-MMP06, LR-FMP04, LR-FMP06, LR-MMP10, SS-FMP03, 
SS-FMP04, SS-MMP10. 
222 Interviews HM-MMP07, LR-MMP01. 
223 Interviews HM-FMP09, HM-MMP05. N.b. Sayama is addressed to a female teacher, but is also 
commonly used to indicate that the (female) being spoken to is knowledgeable and worthy of respect. 
The male equivalent is Saya. 
224 Interview LR-MMP03. 
35 
 
Gatekeepers most commonly mentioned gaining respect as their main reward.226 A TNP 
gatekeeper and member of the CEC talked about how he enjoyed being able to explain how 
politics works to others and it was a symbolic act to be able to bring his parents to Nay Pyi 
Taw.227 
 
While there are some benefits associated with being in politics, they are rather intangible, 
related to increased self-respect as well as respect from others. They are also reserved for 
elected politicians, whereas campaigns seems to be considered difficult without any benefits. 
The cost of politics, i.e. the difficulties that you encounter when you enter the political area as a 
candidate, Member of Parliament, or gatekeeper, are of different character. We will analyse 
personal costs associated with changes in your family life, costs associated with travelling, and 
different forms of illegitimate methods of intimidation, harassment and violence. All are 
important for understanding the hurdles that politicians face, but they may need to be tackled 
very differently. In the remainder of this section, we will explore the difficulties, the perceived 
cost of politics, in more detail. 
 
Family Life228 
Both male and female politicians feel that they have sacrificed family time for politics.229 One 
male candidate from the Pa-O National Organization (PNO) expressed regret at not having 
been able to spend time with his son, causing him to fail a high school matriculation exam.230 
Women seem to express that this sacrifice comes with a feeling of guilt to a higher extent. One 
woman candidate from LNDP said:  
 
“I have not been able to take care of my son who is now at grade 11. I often travelled 
and left him at home for various social affairs. Therefore, I feel guilty for not being a good 
wife to my husband and children.”231 
 
Regarding support from the family, it can be discerned that women are more dependent on 
supporting families and partners than men are. Very few women would probably be able to have 
a political career without the support of their families, whereas this seems to be possible for at 
least some men who say that their wives have disapproved, and sometimes for several years.232 
One gatekeeper from the KSDP says that his wife sometimes tells him to “…grab your stuff 
such as bed sheet, pillow, blanket and go to sleep at your office,” because he does not have 
time for his family after getting involved in politics.233 Some male candidates also acknowledged 
that their wives took domestic responsibility, helped to support the family and helped them in 
their campaigns.234 
 
A woman gatekeeper, and member of the CEC in the incumbent Union Solidarity and 
Development Party (USDP) related that her husband has had to do all the domestic work, such 
as taking care of the children, washing clothes, and dropping and picking up the kids from 
 
225 Interview HM-MMP04. 
226 Interviews HM-MGK02, HM-MGK04, HM-MGK07, LR-GKCECF01, LR-GKCECM01. 
227 HM-MGK04. 
228 Q10. Has your participation in politics resulted in any difficulties or improvements in your home life? 
229 Interviews HM-MMP10, HM-MMP12, LR-FMP05, LR-FMP06. HM-MMP10. 
230 Interview HM-MMP12. 
231 Interview LR-FMP05. 
232 Interviews HM-MGK05, LR-GKCECM06. 
233 Interview LR-GKCECM06 
234 Interviews LR-MMP06, SS-MMP02, SS-MMP06, SS-MMP07. 
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school while she has been an active politician. He did this besides working at a clinic. It is clear 
that both the politician and the husband feel that this is quite remarkable. The husband allegedly 
says “there is no husband like me.”235 Other women, however, also talk about the support they 
have been given from husbands or brothers.236 
 
Difficulties travelling237 
One important reason why family life is affected by a political career is that politicians need to 
spend a lot of time away from home. Running a campaign can be both time-consuming and 
difficult. This dynamic becomes accentuated in constituencies that cover remote areas, where 
access to basic services and to accommodation may be a problem. In certain areas, in 
particular, travelling to remote areas of the constituency can be challenging if the infrastructure 
is not developed. Additional difficulties may include weather-related difficulties. Some areas of 
Myanmar are also conflict-affected, meaning that it is either difficult or dangerous to travel there, 
or that there are travel restrictions imposed by the military authorities.  
 
About half of the candidates reported that they encountered difficulties when they travelled 
around the constituency campaigning. There were no large gender differences in this regard. 
The parties from which most candidates seem to experience difficulties were parties for which a 
large proportion of the constituencies they compete in cover remote areas and areas where 
there is or has been ongoing armed conflict. Three examples are KSDP, LNDP and TNP, who 
are based in Kachin State (KSDP and LNDP) and northern Shan State (TNP) – both areas of 
intense conflict in recent years. All candidates interviewed from LNDP and TNP reported 
difficulties travelling. Two women candidates from the KSDP party claimed they had no 
difficulties travelling while both men from their party said that they did – this is probably due to 
the fact that the two women ran in constituencies in Myitkyina township, which is flat and largely 
urban and less conflict-affected, whereas the constituencies in which the men ran are 
mountainous with several remote and hard-to-reach communities and considerably more 
conflict-affected.238 
 
Thus, while there are no immediately discernible gender differences in the extent to which 
candidates experience difficulties while travelling for your campaign, travel difficulties are clearly 
associated with campaigning in remote areas. Previous analysis of the Pyithu Hluttaw MPs 
elected in 2015 suggests that women are approximately as likely as men MPs to represent 
strongly rural/remote constituencies.239 
 
The security situation is something that is naturally primarily raised by candidates who have had 
to campaign in areas where fighting is still ongoing, or where the Tatmadaw and/or EAOs have 
a lot of influence. Some candidates had to campaign with security in certain areas, others were 
followed by local military authorities during their campaigns.240 In some areas it was not possible 
to campaign at all. One woman LNDP candidate had assisted her party colleague to campaign 
in an area controlled by a local militia, whose leader was the sitting Amyotha Hluttaw MP. This 
 
235 Interview LR-GKCECF01. 
236 Interviews HM-FMP09, LR-FMP03, LR-FMP05. 
237 Q11. Did you face any difficulties travelling around your constituency during the campaign?; q12 Did 
you face any harassment or intimidation during your campaign? 
238 Interviews LR-FMP06, LR-FMP07, LR-MMP10, LR-MMP11. 
239 Gender Equality Network, Gender and Politics in Myanmar: Women and Men Candidates in the 2015 
Elections., p.41. 
240 Interviews HM-MMP06, HM-MMP12. 
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militia leader publicly threatened candidates from rival parties from running in ‘his’ 
constituency.241 After our interviewee won her election, there were worries about her security. 
When they travelled around the constituency there were stones blocking the roads and they 
decided to travel with eleven different vehicles so that they could let her change vehicles often 
to make it more difficult to ambush the one she was sitting in.242  
 
Importantly, although everyone experiences practical difficulties when travelling to such remote 
or conflict-affected areas, there are additional gender aspects if not in the extent of difficulties, 
then at least in the content. In certain remote places it is difficult with water supply and 
hygiene.243 Travelling at night is also not seen as appropriate for many women, and one woman 
SNLD candidate said that women always need to be accompanied by at least one man when 
you are campaigning. She usually brought her husband or son, but sometimes she could go 
with other men from the party.244 The perception that it is not appropriate to travel alone as a 
woman seems to be fairly widespread.245 
 
Financial Difficulties 
Quite a few candidates mentioned financial difficulties as a result of their choice to become 
politically active. Many candidates could not afford to continue with their business to the same 
extent and they were also expected to care for constituents.246 Women were clearly dependent 
on the financial support of husbands and relatives and mentioned this as a prerequisite for their 
career quite often.247 Some of those who were elected claim that the MP salary is not enough, 
but the campaign was of course even more of a loss for those candidates who spent a lot of 
money without being elected.248 
 
Violations of Personal Integrity249 
While debate and criticism are natural parts of democratic election campaigns, personal 
harassment and intimidation is not.250 Intimidation and harassment during election campaigns 
imply that someone tries to impact on the election by violating the personal integrity of a 
candidate. This can be done through physical violence but also through threats and degrading 
talk.251 A majority of our candidate interviewees reported experiencing some form of intimidation 
during their 2015 election campaign. Verbal or online harassment reported by our interviewees 
quite frequently included ethnic or religious aspects. 
 
241 Ye Mon. 
242 Interview LR-FMP05. 
243 Interview SS-FMP01. 
244 Interview HM-FMP11. 
245 E.g. see Interview HM-FMP14. See also, DIPD, Women’s Participation in 2015 Election in Myanmar: 
An Assessment (DIPD, 2016); Minoletti, Gender (in)Equality in the Governance of Myanmar, p.18; 
Minoletti, Women’s Participation in the Subnational Governance of Myanmar, p.28; Emilie Röell, Women 
and Local Leadership: The Leadership Journeys of Myanmar’s 42 Female Village Tract/Ward 
Administrators (Yangon: UNDP, 2015), p.34. 
246 Interviews HM-FMP08, HM-MMP07, LR-MMP09, LR-MMP05; LR-MMP04, LR-MMP09. HM-FMP08 
and HM-MMP07. 
247 For example, see, Interview LR-FMP05. 
248 Interview SS-MMP05. 
249 Q12.  “Did you face any intimidation or harassment during your campaign?” 
250 Mona Lena Krook, ‘Violence Against Women in Politics’, Journal of Democracy, 28.1 (2017), 74–88 
<https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0007>. 
251 Bjarnegård, Elin. 2018. “Making Gender Visible in Election Violence: Strategies for Data Collection”, 
Politics & Gender. Critical Perspectives 14(4): 690-695. 
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While it is difficult to discern any gender differences in the extent of harassment and verbal 
abuse, there seem to be differences in the type of harassment that men and women face. 
Women are more often the victims of personal accusations, including degrading talk directed 
against family members as well as rumours about their person. One 29 year old woman TNP 
candidate experienced belittling talk, hearing rumours saying that she was no more than a child 
and that one cannot trust a child.252 In KSDP, the men reported that it was their party that was 
being criticized, while the woman was personally attacked and accused of land-grabbing by 
other Kachin parties.253  
 
As late as 2012, less than 5% of Myanmar’s population were using the internet, but by 2015 this 
had risen to more than 20%,254 and online harassment was common in the 2015 elections. Such 
harassment included spreading fake photos and issuing rumours via the mobile phones as well 
as accusations and attacks on Facebook.255 One NLD woman candidate recounts that people 
used social media to tell the community that she was arrogant and not liked by anyone in her 
neighbourhood.256 Another woman candidate from NLD said she was harassed on Facebook 
and someone produced a fake news article defaming her in order to convince people to vote for 
someone else.257 A man candidate for SNLD was accused online for meddling with foreigners, 
due to his background working with NGOs.258 
 
Ethnic intolerance was clearly present online as well. One SNLD gatekeeper was called a “Shan 
Racist” on Facebook.259 A (Buddhist) USDP male candidate said that rumours were spread 
about him having a Muslim name on Facebook.260 He interpreted it as an attempt to make 
people misunderstand his ethnicity. Both men and women experienced online threats but it 
seems to be somewhat more common for women to report online intimidation (although it is 
difficult to establish any trends with such a small sample).  
 
There were also isolated incidents of more serious threats and physical violence. One man 
LNDP gatekeeper received a death threat after having organized events that criticised the 
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and after having suggested that a Lisu Social Service Society 
be established.261 A woman NLD candidate recounted how the Association for Protection of 
Race and Religion, better known as Ma Ba Tha, came to her rallies armed with knives. Some 
people were wounded, and in other places she had to cancel public meetings. Some of her 
campaign workers were also threatened because they were working for her.262 
 
Notably, quite a few candidates also said they did not experience any harassment. To be well-
known and respected helped in certain cases. Two candidates who were long-time teachers 
 
252 Interview HM-FMP14. 
253 Interviews LR-FMP07, LR-MMP10, LR-MMP11. 
254 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=MM [Accessed 5th February 2020] 
255 Interviews HM-MMP04, HM-MMP10, HM-FMP15, LR-FMP01, LR-FMP02, LR-FMP03, HM-FMP11, 
LR-GKCECM05, SS-GKCECM04, SS-MMP04, SS-MMP08. 
256 Interview LR-FMP02. 
257 Interview LR-FMP03. 
258 Interview HM-MMP04. 
259 Interview HM-MGK05. 
260 Interview SS-MMP08. 
261 Interview LR-GKCECM05. 
262 Interview LR-FMP02. 
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said that with so many former and current students in the area, and with the respect they had 
gained, they were protected from violence, intimidation or harassment.263  
 
All politicians in contemporary Myanmar have lived in a conflict-prone political environment for a 
long time. They have become accustomed to expecting conflict, hardship or even torture and 
imprisonment when they engage politically. Political activity has not only put themselves, but 
also their family members at risk. One male TNP candidate recounts his experience of 
campaigning in KIA controlled areas in 2010, when KIA members pointed their guns at him, but 
he was able to persuade them to allow him to campaign in their area. Whereas, in what he 
referred to as ‘USDP-controlled areas’ the local militia pointed their guns at him and refused to 
allow him to campaign in their area. However, he did not face such issues in 2015.264 One 
SNLD candidate said that he is used to having inspectors watching and tracing every step, 
always passing by his house, but that this was more common from 1988 to 2004 than it was in 
the most recent election.265 Many candidates, particularly from NLD, simply, and perhaps 
understandably, focused on the improvement they have seen in their ability to participate in 
politics.266 These narratives demonstrate that Myanmar politicians may have normalized attacks 
and abuse, and as such, difficult to compare to narratives with politicians in other contexts. 
 
Implications of Experiences Campaigning and as an MP 
The costs of political participation in Myanmar have been extremely high, for a long period of 
time. Being politically active is closely associated with personal risk, and the harassment of 
politicians is something that many expect when going into politics. While systematic repression 
of opposition politicians is no longer the norm, harassment of candidates has become 
normalized and other costs of political participation are high. The violent legacy of politics in 
Myanmar means that a new norm has to be institutionalized. Given the expectations of 
politicians, we are likely to see an underreporting of incidents. 
 
The expansion of Internet usage has also changed the way which public figures, including 
politicians, can be reached - and harassed. This is true in Myanmar as elsewhere, but in 
Myanmar internet and elections appeared at about the same time, and are both new 
phenomena. Since 2015, internet access has increased even more, so online harassment is 
likely to be a challenge for the future.  
 
In Myanmar, as elsewhere, women are more dependent on family support than men are if they 
are to become political leaders. Women need the permission of their husband to use savings for 
the campaign, whereas men very rarely seem to ask for permission. Women also need a man 
who can accompany them on sometimes long and difficult campaign travel, as it is not seen as 
appropriate and safe for a woman to go alone or without her husband. 
 
7. Being an Elected Representative 
This section looks at the priorities of elected MPs. Specifically, we examine if gender and/or 
ethnic issues are prioritized by the MPs. This is an attempt to study the substantive 
 
263 Interviews LR-MMP01, LR-MMP04. 
264 Interview HM-MMP05. 
265 Interview HM-MGK01. 
266 For example, see, Interview SS-GKTECM02. 
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representation of elected women and men MPs.267 The more specific they are, the more certain 
can we be that the issues they raise is something that they do care about and work for, rather 
than something that “sounds nice”.  
 
Both gatekeepers and candidates were asked which issues they would prioritized if/once they 
were elected. There was a discernible difference between gatekeepers and candidates in most 
parties. As expected, gatekeepers are mainly concerned with organizing party members and 
promoting the capacity of their respective parties, whereas MPs need to take care of the needs 
and interests of their constituency members. Community development issues, such as 
infrastructure, schooling, healthcare and electricity, are thus prominent among most MPs.268 For 
instance, in the MNP party, gatekeepers mentioned party merger as a prioritized issue, while 
candidates mentioned representing their constituents. An MNP MP says that your image 
becomes more important once you are an MP. You have to demonstrate that you know the 
difficulties of your constituency and that you are able to use your professional and creative skills 
to create job opportunities.269 One elected TNP Pyithu hluttaw MP seemed to think that it was 
difficult to actually accomplish anything.: 
 
“I am a member of the Ethnic Affairs and Internal Peace Implementation Committee. 
This is just for show, we did not make much improvement.”270 
 
A woman SNLD representative, a member of the same Pyihtu hluttaw committee expressed 
similar frustrations.271 
 
Members of parliaments representing ethnic parties, in particular, emphasize ceasefire and 
decentralization as important issues.272 Women are a little more likely to mention issues like 
maternal and childcare issues,273 including sending cases of child rape and divorces to relevant 
departments.274 
 
When asked about what issues they thought should be debated more, the most common 
answer among elected Members of Parliament was ethnic peace and economic development. 
However, only two women replied ethnic peace and three women replied economic 
development. Men were more likely to give these answers than women were, with over a 
quarter of all men mentioning economic development and over 40% answering ethnic peace. 
The politicians mentioning that ethnic peace should be debated more come from all parties.  
 
267 Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson and Roseanna  Michelle Heath, ‘Do Women Legislators Have Different 
Policy Priorities than Their Male Colleagues?’, Women & Politics, 24.4 (2003), 77–101 
<https://doi.org/10.1300/J014v24n04_04>; Manon Tremblay, ‘Do Female MPs Substantively Represent 
Women? A Study of Legislative Behaviour in Canada’s 35th Parliament’, Canadian Journal of Political 
Science, 31.03 (1998), 435 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423900009082>; Waikeung Tam, ‘Do Female 
Legislators Have Different Policy Priorities Than Their Male Colleagues in an Undemocratic/Semi-
Democratic Legislature? The Case of Hong Kong’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 23.1 (2017), 44–70 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2017.1283174>. 
268 For example, see, Interviews SS-MMP01, SS-MMP06. 
269 Interview SS-MMP07. 
270 Interview HM-MMP02. 
271 Interview HM-FMP08. 
272 For example, see, Interviews HM-MMP02, HM-MMP07, HM-MMP12, HM-MMP13, LR-FMP06; LR-
FMP07; SS-FMP01, SS-MMP02, SS-MMP03. However, note that some USDP members emphasize 
these issues, e.g. Interviews LR-MMP05 and LR-MMP08. 
273 For example, see, Interviews LR-FMP06, SS-FMP04 
274 Interview SS-FMP04 
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Over 40% of the women candidates mention women’s/gender issues as something that should 
be debated more, but only four men candidates (i.e. around 15%) mention issues that can be 
interpreted as gender issues in some way – two mention domestic violence, and one equal 
opportunities.  
 
8. Key Findings 
Interviewees’ Background. Education, and wholesale and retail trade are the most prevalent 
occupational backgrounds for the women candidates interviewed for this study. A majority of 
gatekeeper interviewees had a family member(s) involved in politics. For candidates, women 
were more likely than men to have a family member involved in politics. This suggests familial 
succession and networks are common channels of recruiting political leaders.  
Motivations for joining politics. For women, the role of father is found to play a key motivating 
factor for their participation in politics. For both men and women, previous experience in political 
activities play a key role. Additionally, those with a background in social or religious groups, or 
as teachers are more likely to join public life, while those from ethnic-based parties with 
experience in community/church based groups are more likely to join politics.  
 
Intraparty Politics. The extent to which the selection of CEC, CC and TEC members is 
democratic and systematic varies not just between parties, but within them – for example NLD 
have a largely democratic and systematic process for TEC and CC selection but this is not the 
case for their CEC selection.  
 
Gender Balance of CEC. All the CECs in our study are male-dominated. Of the six parties with 
complete data, the KSDP has the highest proportion of female CEC members (31%) while the 
ANP and TNP have the lowest (5%). Only two parties (KSDP and MNP) have over 20% women.   
 
Formation and Selection of CEC. The sizes of the CECs for the nine parties under study vary 
considerably, from the smallest 19 members for the TNP to 48 members for the PNO. How 
parties select their CEC members also varies considerably, ranging from the highly democratic 
and systematic process of the MNP, to the wholly unelected and non-systematic process of the 
LNDP.  
 
Formation and Selection of CC. The size of CCs also varies, from 58 for the TNP, to more 
than 200 for the PNO and 350 for USDP. Comparatively, the MNP has the most democratic 
bottom-up process for choosing CC (and CEC) members. ANP, NLD and USDP all have a fairly 
bottom-up process for selecting their CC members, with most or all CC members elected via a 
process in which Village/Ward parties nominate members for the TEC, and then the TEC 
nominates members for District level, District level nominates to State/Region level, and then 
State/Region level committees nominate/elect CC members.  
 
Formation and Selection of TEC. We do not have complete information on the size of parties’ 
TECs, and within some parties this seems to sometimes vary by Township. The most common 
selection method is self-nomination, followed by attendees being asked to confirm or reject the 
nominees. TEC selection meetings are typically held every one or two years. 
 
Candidate Selection for Pyithu and State/Region Hluttaws. Theoretically, most parties follow 
a ‘standard process’ to nominate candidates to State/Region and Pyithu Hluttaws – beginning 
with the Township level party arranging a candidate election process, after which the nominated 
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candidates would be sent to CC and CEC level for scrutiny and then approval/rejection. LNDP, 
NLD and TNP largely follow the ‘standard process’, whereas the MNP, PNO, SNLD mentioned 
appointment of candidates by central party if Townships are unable to find enough candidates. 
KSDP’s disorganization led to a largely appointment process while there was inconsistent 
response from the USDP. The ANP followed the ‘standard process’ for the State/Region 
parliaments and has a cooperative process between Township and Central level party for 
choosing Pyithu Hluttaw candidates.   
 
Candidate Selection for Amyotha Hluttaw. Most Amyotha Hluttaw constituencies in Myanmar 
cover more than one Township, making the role of Township parties for candidate selection less 
straightforward than for selection of candidates to Pyithu and State/Region Hluttaws. While the 
PNO and SNLD have the central-level party lead the candidate selection process, the NLD has 
the State/Region-level party leading. The ANP and USDP have cooperative processes between 
central level and the relevant Townships. For the MNP, all of the Amyotha Hluttaw 
constituencies they ran were in single Townships only, so they could follow the same process 
used for Pyithu and State/Region Hluttaw candidate selection. We were not able to establish 
how the KSDP, LNDP and TNP select candidates for Amyotha Hluttaw. 
 
Selectorate. Parties vary considerably on the selectorate – who has the most power in 
candidate selection. Despite our data limitations, the CEC is largely seen to be more important 
than the CC in nominating candidates. This is the case for the ANP, MNP, NLD, TNP and 
USDP. For KSDP, LNDP, PNO and SNLD the process is unclear. Additionally, the ANP, MNP 
and NLD also mentioned a “candidate selection/election winning teams” at the central level, 
separate from the CEC, to manage candidate selection. The USDP also has a candidate 
selection teams at Township, District and State/Region levels that submits the 
recommendations directly to the CEC. Some parties also mentioned that non-party members 
such as religious leaders who may influence candidate selection at Township level. 
 
Preferred Candidate Traits. There was no major gender difference between interviewees 
regarding the preference for candidate traits. Many prefer candidates with a high level of 
education. Other traits, in descending order of preference include: being young; ethnicity; 
popularity/respectability; occupational background; political background/experience. Only a 
small number highlighted gender as a preferred trait.   
 
Campaign and Political Experiences. Most candidates know there are high personal costs 
from participating in politics. Over 80% of women and men candidates reported no significant 
improvements in their personal lives because of their political activities. Both male and female 
politicians feel family time have been sacrificed for politics. While both male and female 
candidates in constituencies covering remote or conflict-affected areas faced travel difficulties, 
there are additional gender aspects on the extent of difficulties. Travelling at night is seen 
inappropriate for women.  
 
Financial Difficulties. Financial difficulties have been mentioned by some as a result of their 
choice to become politically active. A number of women mentioned that they relied on the 
financial assistance of husbands and relatives to support their political career. Some also claim 
that the MP salary is not enough. 
 
Violations of Personal Integrity. It is difficult to discern any gender differences in the extent of 
harassment and verbal abuse faced by candidates. However, there are gender differences in 
the type of harassment reported. Increased Internet use has also changed the way politicians 
are harassed. Both men and women experienced online ethnic- or religious-based intimidation 
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speech. However, women are more likely to be the victims of personal accusations, including 
degrading talk directed against family members.  
 
Substantive representation. Gatekeepers and candidates highlighted different priorities and 
issues that they champion. Gatekeepers are concerned with organizing party members and 
promoting the capacity of their parties, whereas MPs/candidates highlight the needs and 
interests of their constituency members and community development issues, such as 
infrastructure, schooling, healthcare and electricity. MPs also largely highlight ethnic peace and 
economic development as key priority issues for debate in parliament. Over 40% of the women 
candidates mentioned that women’s/gender issues should be debated more. 
 
 
9. Recommendations 
Recommendation 1: Build party organization and establish rules 
There is large heterogeneity between and within parties on candidate selection to key party 
positions and also national/local elected bodies. A key priority for parties to improve gender 
equality is to establish clear rules on who and how one gets elected to key party positions and 
publicize candidate selection processes to State/Region Pyithu Hluttaw and Amyotha Hluttaw as 
widely as possible. Having clear rules will encourage transparency, accountability and attract 
more potential candidates to self-nominate or run for elected positions.   
 
Recommendation 2: Expand and diversify candidate pool from bottom-up 
Parties need to move away from informal networks of identifying candidates through family or 
community networks to develop formal ways to recruit, nominate and select their candidates to 
improve gender balance at the party, local and national levels. The bottom up, democratic 
process with clear selection rules and local participation will help to expand the pool of 
candidates and also the quality, diversity and supply of candidates. Local politicians with local 
knowledge and networks are more likely to be more effective representatives of their 
constituencies. After elected, local women MPs are more likely to prioritize local gender issues 
for debate in parliament.   
 
Recommendation 3: Establish party quota or targets 
Parties adopting a quota or target to achieve 30% of women candidates are more likely to 
significantly raise the percentage of women MPs. Party leaders should take the lead to promote 
and encourage the CEC, CC and TECs to adopt a quota or targets in electing the candidates to 
key party bodies and ensure the candidate list has at least 30% women. The CNLD target of 
30% women candidates for the 2020 election is an example of this approach.   
 
Recommendation 4: Provide financial support to women candidates  
While education level is not a barrier to women joining politics, financial dependency on 
husbands is one barrier to women joining politics. Hence, parties can help to reduce the 
financial burden by providing a small subsidy for women to self-nominate as candidates. We 
Many Myanmar political parties have limited financial resources, and so international donors 
should consider funding such initiatives. 
 
 
Recommendation 5: Improve security and provide women candidates a party aide during 
campaign in the rural area 
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Being politically active and running campaigns is difficult, time consuming and potentially 
dangerous. Candidate harassment is a problem and there are still cultural norms that can act as 
a barrier to women travelling at night. Given Myanmar’s violent past, there is a need to establish 
new norm and improve security for candidates, especially for women. One way to address the 
security of candidates is for the parties to establish a norm of providing candidates, especially 
women, a party aide to travel to rural areas to campaign. 
 
Recommendation 6: Provide training classes and establish best practices for candidates 
to campaign with social network and develop online presence  
While all candidates face harassment, women are more likely to face personal accusations, 
degrading talks and criticisms about family members and their personal lives on social network 
platforms. Parties should consider hiring consultants to provide training classes for ethnic 
minority and women candidates to develop their professional online image and establish best 
practices to respond to disinformation, online hate and harassment during campaigns.   
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